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Trials are vanishing. At the same time, individuals, corporations,
and other institutions have become wealthier, more powerful, and more
influential than ever before. The stakes in litigation have reached
unprecedented heights. With the expansion of the global economy,
disputes between parties involve significant pre-trial strategy and cost
considerations on both domestic and international levels. Complex cases
are being increasingly resolved through settlement agreements based on
massive discovery cost considerations and expected outcomes after pretrial motion practice.
An unrealized consequence of the vanishing trial phenomenon is a
corresponding lack of input from the federal appellate courts in some of
the most important and cutting-edge cases. In response to this trend, this
Article argues for increasing litigants’ access to federal appellate courts
through “manufactured finality.” After exploring the historical origins,
rationale, and cost considerations underlying the final judgment rule, the
Article analyzes the concept of “manufactured finality,” or the ability to
appeal partial adjudications by dismissing non adjudicated claims without
prejudice. The Article argues that a gradual shift toward acceptance of
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manufactured finality is inevitable. As a result, the United States Supreme
Court should endorse criteria for appellate courts to consider when
deciding whether to review a partial adjudication as a final judgment.
Such an effort would balance and smooth the transition to greater
appellate court access, and provide much needed definition and clarity to
a more workable and modernized final judgment rule.
INTRODUCTION
As the world embraces new technology, globalization, and increased
concentrations of wealth in the hands of elite groups of individuals,
corporations, and other institutions, the nature of litigation is changing.1
Cases are bigger, more complex, and involve stakes larger than ever
before.2 At the same time, the explosively high costs of discovery and
1 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1st ed. 2014)
(discussing the increased wealth of the world’s top 1, .1, and .01 percent of the population,
and noting a return to a pre-World War I economic structure referred to as “patrimonial
capitalism” where birth and inherited wealth will be a greater influence on an individual’s
socio-economic status in comparison to talent or hard work); Anup Shah, Poverty Around
the World: Inequality, Globalization, and a New Global Elite, (Nov. 12. 2001),
http://www.globalissues.org/article/4/poverty-around-the-world (noting an increased
concentration of wealth in a new global elite); Robert Hunter Wade, The Rising Inequality
of World Income Distribution, 38 FIN. & DEV.: A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE OF THE IMF 4,
(2001) available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/wade.htm
(discussing the “champagne glass” structure of the global economy, where over 80% of the
world’s wealth is in the hands of the richest 20% of the population).
2 Most recently technology, tort, and financial litigation have involved multi-billion
dollar amounts. For example, Apple recently recovered over $1B from Samsung in a patent
dispute. The cases are Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96302
(N.D. Cal. July 11, 12012) and Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS91450 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013), and selected case documents are available at
http://cand.uscourts.gov/lhk/applevsamsung. The case received widespread media
attention. See Jessica A. Vascalero, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case: Jury Finds Samsung
Mobile Devices Infringed Six Apple Patents, Awards $1.05 Billion in Damages, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 25, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000087239639044435840457
7609810658082898. A South Dakota lean fine textured beef producer also recently sued
for more than $1B in damages based on defamation and disparagement. See Beef Products
Inc et al v. American Broadcasting Cos et al, Circuit Court of South Dakota, Union County,
No. 12-292. A discussion of the case is available at http://www.law360.com/articles
/541151/abc-diane-sawyer-can-t-escape-1-2b-pink-slime-suit. JP Morgan’s $13B payout
for mortgage lending practices also received widespread media attention. See Neil Irwin,
Everything You Need to Know About JP Morgan’s $13 Billion Settlement, WASH. POST,
Nov. 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/21/
everything-you-need-to-know-about-jpmorgans-13-billion-settlement/. See also Kevin
LaCroix, Substantiating the Explosive Growth in M&A Related Litigation, The D&O
Diary, (Posted on January 17, 2012) available at http://www.dandodiary.com
/articles/securities-litigation/ (remarking that , “[r]eports corroborate the explosive growth
in M&A-related litigation on deals worth $100M or more in recent years,” but also noting
that much of this litigation is in state courts – traditionally Delaware); Kevin LaCroix, Are
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litigation have led to a preference for settlement in order to resolve
disputes in place of trials.3
This raises the question: on what basis are these massive block-buster
cases being settled? Today, parties negotiate the terms of a settlement
agreement in light of the success and failure of pre-trial motion practice,
critical documents found in discovery, and calculations about the expected
outcomes of a trial, even if one is never held.4 With the stakes so high,
Securities Class Action Opt-Out Actions Back?, THE D&O DIARY, (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.dandodiary.com/articles/securities-litigation/ (noting the rise of opt-outs and
the large settlements they obtain in securities class actions).
3 See Lawyers for Civil Justice et. al., Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies,
May 10-11, 2010, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Duke%20Materials/Library/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Compan
ies.pdf. (noting that in aggregate, companies spend billions of dollars on litigation spend
due to ballooning discovery costs and fees.).
4 For a discussion of the settlement phenomenon see Christina L. Boyd & David A.
Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming Oct. 2010),
(Temple Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-8. available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649643 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1649643) (noting the
attention scholars have paid to, “settlement’s propriety, timing, incidence, and
causes . . . given that most filed civil cases settle.”); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most
Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STANFORD L. REV.
1339 (1994) (noting that “‘[m]ost cases settle’ has become commonplace in discussions of
civil justice,” while acknowledging this observation requires some qualification due to
statistics representing cases that do not go to trial that may also include cases disposed of
by authoritative decisions in ways other than trial.) The growing ADR movement,
mediation, arbitration, and non-traditional dispute resolution mechanisms also play a large
role on the decreasing frequency of trials. Robert J. Niemic, Mediation Becoming More
Appealing in Federal and State Courts, 5 DISP. RESOL. 13 (Summer 1999) (noting that,
“[i]n the trial courts, ADR diverts some disputes – expensive commercial transaction cases,
for example – out of the court system that might otherwise generate difficult and complex
appeals. The ADR movement also took root at the appellate level. Most appellate courts
have established an in-court ADR track and more resources are being invested in settling
appeals with the result of increasing the supply of appellate decisionmaking.”); Mori
Irvine, Better Late Than Never: Settlement at the Federal Court of Appeals, 1 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 341, 342—350 (1999) (“95%] of all federal civil cases settle before trial.”)
(describing the 1990 passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act and the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998 solidifying a variety of ADR processes and settlement mechanisms
the district courts might implement including mediation, arbitration, neutral case
evaluation, summary jury trials, and other hybrids). The article also outlines the
development of ADR at the appellate level beginning with the 2nd circuit’s Civil Appeals
Management Plan (CAMP) which has eventually led to, “nearly every United States court
of appeals . . . establish[ing] a mediation program to assist parties in resolving their
appeals . . . established under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 33.” Id.; see
generally Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute
(Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998)
(acknowledging and discussing the use of form contracts to bind consumers to arbitrate
claims arising out of purchases of wireless phones, home computers, and televisions
despite concerns about disparate bargaining power). Regardless of the cause, trials are
vanishing. See Blake D. Morant, The Declining Prevalence of Trials As A Dispute
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winning or losing a pre-trial motion can swing the settlement pendulum
millions of dollars in one direction or the other.5
The new cost structure and trends towards settlement have not
escaped the attention of the judiciary, or the Supreme Court.6 Procedural
rule changes from recent decisions have begun to fundamentally change
the way federal court litigators practice.7 Perhaps the most noteworthy of
these changes have been modifications to the pleading requirements and
the ability of claims to survive a motion to dismiss.8 Specifically, the
Supreme Court’s adoption of heightened fact pleading requirements in
Iqbal and Twombly have gained widespread attention, and generated
vigorous debate about whether the new standards will stifle
underdeveloped, yet ultimately meritorious claims.9 Although speculation
runs rampant about the exact reasoning behind the heightened pleading
requirements, the changes are due, in part, to an effort to reduce the
number of non-meritorious claims that survive motions to dismiss.10
Recognizing that litigation can be just as much a resource war as it is a
purely legal one, in the modern economy, a litigant’s ability to survive a
motion to dismiss, can create immense pressure on opposing parties to
Resolution Device: Implications of the Academy, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1123, 11241130 (2012) (“The trend toward fewer trials is indispensable. From the middle of the
twentieth century until the present, the number of disputes that are finally decided in
judicial proceedings has declined exponentially . . . [t]he diminished use of trials may also
be attributed to the increased employment of less costly procedures grouped
within . . . Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) . . . [and] the judiciary’s tendency to
encourage settlement.”); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460
– 464 (“[t]he absolute number of trials has undergone a sharp decline . . . [t]he decline in
the rate of civil trials in the post-World War II federal courts continues and accentuates a
long historic trend away from trial as the mode of disposing of civil cases.”); Thomas E.
Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 101, 107 (2006) (“According to recent studies, the classical trial is vanishing.
There has been a long-term, gradual decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trials.
There has been a pronounced, steep decline in the absolute number of trials in the past
twenty years.”); cf. Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State
Courts Over The Last Half Century, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 133, 134 (2006) (“But this
raises a question: Why the vanishing-trials phenomenon . . . that is, the sharp decline in the
percentage of cases that are resolved by judgment after trial?”).
5 Pierre H. Bergeron & Bruce A. Khula, The Future of Discretionary Appellate
Review, 31 APP. PRAC. 3 (2012) (“A single errant ruling swings the settlement pendulum
millions of dollars in one direction or the other.”).
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (building upon the plausibility standard in
Twombly); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (adopting a heightened
plausibility pleading standard).
7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
9
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
10 See infra note 11.
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settle, purely because of the massive costs associated with commencing
discovery.11 The Court recognized that in today’s world, when plaintiff’s
win motions to dismiss , it is not too different from winning period.12
At the same time, in many areas of the law, significant settlement
activity is occurring without any input from the appellate judiciary.13 In
the earliest stages of the federal judiciary, organizing appellate review
required a Supreme Court Justice to go circuit riding, and travel long
distances to sit with district court judges in order to create appellate

11

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559-60 (2007) ((“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy
of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery
process through “careful case management,” given the common lament that the success of
judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. . . . And it is
self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of
evidence at the summary judgment stage,” much less lucid instructions to juries; the threat
of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases
before reaching those proceedings.”) (citations omitted)).
12 Id.
13 Settlement has “become the dominant trend in civil litigation over the past several
decades . . . [but as] fewer cases go to trial or even reach an identifiable final judgment - - [t]he ultimate results of these rends is that fewer and fewer district court decisions are
scrutinized by the appellate courts. See Bergeron and Khula supra note 5. For example,
“[m]ass tort trial judges are creating systematizing, and refining the genre alone, without
the guidance of appellate courts. [B]ecause mass tort litigation almost exclusively
emphasizes pretrial maneuvering and settlement, appellate courts never review many of
the most controversial rulings and innovations of mass tort trial judges. Id. This is also
happening in FCPA jurisprudence. Commenting on United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738
(5th Cir. 2004), FCPA litigators noted that, “[a]lthough technically binding only in the 5th
circuit, the Kay decision is likely to be persuasive precedent throughout the United States,
particularly because so few FCPA matters result in appellate rulings. See Philip Urofsky
&Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO
BRIBES OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
(Shearman & Sterling LLP, Wash. D.C.), Mar. 1, 2009, at 1, 10, available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-030509-FCPA-Digest-Cases-And-ReviewRelating-to%20Bribes-to-Foreign-Officials-under-the-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-Act.pdf
(discussing United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) cited in Daniel J. Grimm,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisitions Transactions: Successor
Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J. OF LAW & BUS. 247, 279 (2010). “[T]he SEC’s
enforcement strategy . . . forces settlement and leaves little judicial accountability. There
are very few precedents for dealing with the FCPA so there is little judicial guidance to
follow.” See e.g. Jacquelyn Lumb, SEC Historical Society Panel Discusses Developments
in FCPA, SEC TODAY (Wash. Servs. Bureau, Chi., Ill), Apr 21, 2010, at 1 (discussing
comments by law professor Jeffrey Mann) cited in Grimm, at 279, n. 150. In FCPA
jurisprudence,”[t]here aren’t that many cases that go to trial,” and “[t]he vast majority of
cases have resulted in settlements.” David Glovin, Kozeny to Spend Investor’s Oil Bribery
Trial at Bahamas Estate, BLOOMBERG, May 30, 2009 (quoting Danforth Newcomb of
Shearman Sterling LLP on the FCPA trial of Frederic Bourke, calling it “a legal rarity,” as
“‘[t]here aren’t that many cases that go to trial in the FCPA area.’”).
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panels.14 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this meant that
appellate court proceedings required a far greater expenditure of time and
resources in comparison to district court pre-trial and trial proceedings.15
In today’s world, the resource costs have flipped.16 Appellate panels are
easily convened, federal appellate review has transformed into a low cost,
largely electronic and online based phenomenon, and pre-trial discovery
is the cornerstone cost consideration for party’s engaged in litigation.17
As a result, changes to the pleading standards should mark the
beginning and not the end of modifications to the procedural rules. Future
modifications should be based not only on growing discovery costs and
the vanishing trial phenomenon, but also upon the decreased costs of
appellate review in today’s world in comparison to the past. One such
needed yet overlooked modification to the procedural rules is increasing
access to the appellate courts through relaxation and modernization of the
final judgment rule. Specifically this article that argues the Supreme Court
should take advantage of the new low cost structure of appellate review by
encouraging resolution of legal questions before factual ones in large and
complex cases.18 The Supreme Court can accomplish this by permitting
limited forms of manufactured finality.19
In this context, manufactured finality refers to appealing an adverse
partial adjudication after dismissing any non-adjudicated claims without
prejudice. For practitioners, relaxation of the final judgment rule may
prevent hasty and unwise decisions about settlement based on significant,
14

See THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009). Professor Baker provides a detailed analysis of
the major historical stages of the federal court system from the creation of the Supreme
Court in Article III of the Constitution and the historic Judiciary Act of 1789 to all versions
leading up to the modern structure of the federal judiciary. Professor Baker outlines the
fact that non-Supreme Court appeals originally required two Supreme Court justices to sit
with a district judge as a panel. Later, Congress reconstituted the circuit courts to require
that only one justice and one district judge sit on an appellate panel. By 1891, the country
had become too large for circuit riding to be feasible for the justices.
15 Id.; see also Paul D. Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts:
Relationships in the Future, in C. Harrison & R. Wheeler, eds., THE FED. APP. JUDICIARY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Federal Judicial Center 1989)(writing generally about the need for
more appellate court involvement in district court decisions involving appeal. In particular,
Professor Carrington argues the late Dean Roscoe Pound would agree with increased
appellate involvement before traditional final judgment due to the reversed resource
requirements of trials and appeals where appeals now require significantly less resources
than trial proceedings).
16 Id.
17 See Lawyers for Civil Justice et. Al, supra note 3 (acknowledging the ballooning
costs of massive discovery and pre-trial expenditures).
18
See supra note 15.
19 See infra Parts III B & III C.
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yet potentially errant rulings without appellate court consideration.20 For
district court judges, permitting limited manufactured finality will
significantly help control dockets, avoid the unnecessary expenditure of
judicial resources, and lead to clearer rulings on complex issues due to
added appellate court guidance.21 For appellate courts, increasing access
will lead to higher quality, much needed, and greater numbers of higher
court legal precedent, critical to the proper development of emerging areas
of the law.22 For policy makers, a more uniform, clear, and balanced
approach to finality will remove doctrinal inconsistency, and lead to better
and fairer settlements.23
Part I provides the background and history of the final judgment rule.
Part II addresses a three-rule circuit split on the issue of manufactured
finality, and analyzes the issue based on seven different criteria. Part III
A argues a relaxation and modernization of the final judgment rule and
limited acceptance of manufactured finality is inevitable and already
underway. Part III B argues the fairness, efficiency, and piecemeal
litigation advantages of limited manufactured finality outweigh appellate
resource cost disadvantages. Part III C argues Supreme Court action can
harmonize the transition towards a modern and more relaxed view of the
final judgment rule.
I. BACKGROUND
In its infant stages, the structure of the judiciary changed
significantly from the initial creation of the U.S. federal court system in
the late eighteenth century.24 As the need for appellate review became
more widespread due to “geographical expansion, population growth,
commercial development and expansions of jurisdiction,” Congress
ultimately passed the 1891 Evarts Act,25 which created the framework for
the appellate judiciary that is in place today.26
Yet throughout that time, the final judgment rule has remained
largely untouched.27 While there have been plenty of exceptions and
moves over, under, and around the final judgment rule that have
20

See infra note 229 and corresponding text.
See infra note 237 and corresponding text.
22 See infra note 229 and corresponding text.
23 See infra note 229 and corresponding text.
24 See BAKER, supra note 14.
25 Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891); see THOMAS E. BAKER,
A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS § 1.03 History of the
Courts of Appeals, (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009).
26
Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
27 See infra notes 28–29, 31.
21

2014]

Increase Access to the Appellate Courts

49

marginally increased appellate rights, the final judgment rule remains the
“primary gatekeeper” to the doors of the appellate courts.28 With roots
predating the founding of the country,29 recitations of the final judgment
rule can be found in the 1789 Judiciary Act,30 in a form substantially
similar to the rule’s modern-day codification in Section 1291 of the United
States Code.31 Consistent with these firmly grounded historical roots,
there have been few major changes to the application of the final judgment
rule apart from the adoption of Rule 54(b) in 1939.
Rule 54(b) states that federal district courts “may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties . . . [w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief” and
“[t]here is no just reason for delay.”32 The purpose of Rule 54(b) was to
modernize appellate procedural rules and balance the deep-rooted interest
against piecemeal litigation with the recognition that there are situations
where allowing an appeal before resolution of an entire action is
beneficial.33 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Rule 54(b) was
28 John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence
With Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L. J. 200, 204 (1994).
29 Id. at 202 (citing 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3906, at
264 (1992)) (“the final judgment rule can be traced to the write of error at English common
law.”).
30 Id. at n. 13. Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States; Chapter XX,
§§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83 – 87:
[Section 21:] [F]rom final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or
value of three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed
to the next circuit court . . .
[Section 22] [F]inal decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court,
where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive
of costs, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit
court . . . upon a writ of error . . . . And upon a like process, may final
judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit
court . . . where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand
dollars, exclusive of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the
Supreme Court . . . .
[Section 25] [A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of
law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had . . . may
be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
Stats upon a write of error . . . .
31 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) (“The circuit courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . .”).
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
33 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956) (discussing the
promulgation of Rule 54(b) and its amendments in order to “meet[] the current needs of
judicial administration.”); see also Marianne Fogarty, The Finality of Partial Orders in
Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 643-644 nn. 48-50
(1989) (recognizing that courts have also approached the final judgment rule pragmatically
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in large part a response to the increasing complexity and size of litigation,
and was intended to implement a newfound recognition that the smallest
“judicial unit” for appellate review was no longer an entire case, but often
times, rulings within a case.34
Despite the adoption of Rule 54(b) close to seventy-five years ago,
academics, practitioners, and judges have questioned whether additional
steps are necessary to change the civil practice rules yet again to adapt to
the modern day realities of litigation. Specifically, “[i]s it time to revisit
the rigidity of the final order doctrine?”35 Others have simply commented,
“[t]he final judgment rule is not working very well.”36 These calls to
action should no longer be ignored. The Supreme Court should modernize
the final judgment rule and permit limited forms of manufactured finality.
This long overdue change will properly align the federal judiciary with the
new cost structure of litigation in today’s world, increase much needed
access to the appellate courts, and lead to better-reasoned and more
equitable settlements.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Commentators, judges, academics, and policy makers have
approached the issue of manufactured finality in different ways. Some
have emphasized whether the circuits have overlooked the importance of
whether dismissals of non-adjudicated claims are with or without
prejudice.37 Some have found the issue is best understood by focusing on
and with considerations of “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”)
(citing Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848)); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). The author also notes that Forgay, “provided the first
secure basis for interpreting the final judgment requirement flexibly in order to alleviate
the hardship that may result if orders . . . cannot be reviewed until entry of the clearly final
order.” Marianne Fogarty, The Finality of Partial Orders in Consolidated Cases Under
Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 643-644 nn. 48-50 (1989) (citing 15 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3910, at 453).
34
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. at 432 (“[w]ith the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, there came an increased opportunity for the liberal joinder of claims in
multiple claims actions. This, in turn, demonstrated a need for relaxing the restrictions
upon what should be treated as a judicial unit for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.”); Cold
Metal Process Co. v. United Co., 351 U.S. 455, 453 (1956) (“[t]he amended rule meets the
needs and problems of modern judicial administration by adjusting the unit for appeal to
fit multiple claims actions, while retaining a right of judicial review over the discretion
exercised by the District Court . . . .”).
35 See Bergeron and Khula, supra note 5.
36 Howard B. Eisenberg and Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of
Non-Final Orders: Its Time to Change the Rules, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999).
37 See Rebecca A. Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by “Manufacturing” A Final
Judgment Through Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 MERCER L. REV. 979,
981 (1997) (“In particular the, the trial and appellate courts’ practice of overlooking or
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whether there is “practical” prejudice, or whether the non-adjudicated
claims can be disregarded for purposes of finality because they are lost due
to some external consideration (i.e. lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
expiration of the statute of limitations, etc . . . ).38 Yet others emphasize
whether the non-adjudicated dismissals are for particular defendant(s),
among a variety of other approaches and variations of the issue.39
This article categorizes the circuits into three categories: (1) circuits
rejecting manufactured finality;40 (2) circuits permitting manufactured
finality;41 and (3) circuits applying a discretionary and manipulation based
standard that allows limited forms of manufactured finality.42 These
categories are referred to as the Ryan, the Per Se, and the Discretionary
Standard rules respectively.
After a brief introduction of each of these rules, seven major criteria
are used to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the approaches
listed. The article ultimately argues in favor of a discretionary standard
applied on a case-by-case basis.

discounting language of dismissal with or without prejudice and examining instead the
record to search for the litigants’ and trial judges’ intent is analyzed and found unwise,
wasteful, and confusing.”).
38 See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary Dist., 629 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2010)
(statute of limitations expired) (citing Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634, 639 (7th
Cir. 2008)); Manez v. Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, LLC, 533 F.3d 578,
583-84 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing without prejudice dismissal still created finality if the
claims lack subject matter jurisdiction in that court or would be dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds); LNC Investments LLC v. Republic Nicaragua, 396 F.3d 342 (3d Cir.
2005) (statute of limitations expired); see also Bennett Evan Cooper, “Manufacturing
Finality” and the Right to Appeal in Federal Courts, ABA Appellate Practice Committee
Newsletter Vol. 32 No.1 (December 18, 2012) (recognizing that dismissals of claims
without prejudice can create finality in certain circuits because they are practically with
prejudice).
39 See Cooper, supra note 38 (recognizing that certain jurisdictions have allowed
dismissals without prejudice to manufacture finality where the dismissals are of all claims
against a particular defendant or defendants). For example, there is a circuit split as to
whether parties should be able to appeal a partial judgment in consolidated cases under
Rule 42(a). Some circuits always allow parties to appeal a partial judgment of an action in
a consolidated case by deeming the partial judgments – final under Section 1291. Other
circuits require the parties to seek a Rule 54(b) certificate to appeal the partial judgment.
And yet others have determined that after consolidation, the only appealable judicial unit
is an entire case – effectively denying all partial appeals in consolidated cases. See
Jacqueline Gerson, The Appealability of Partial Judgments in Consolidated Cases, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1990) (discussing “three different conclusions on the
appealability of uncertified partial judgments in consolidated cases”).
40 See infra note 44.
41
See infra note 48.
42 See infra notes 51.
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A. The Three Main Approaches to Manufactured Finality: the Ryan, Per
Se, and Discretionary Standard Rules
1. Ryan Rule
Perhaps the oldest and most traditional approach to manufactured
finality is an approach rejecting all forms of it, referred to as the Ryan rule.
The Ryan rule provides that circuit courts deny the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction in all instances involving any form of manufactured finality –
no matter how well intentioned or innocuous. The name, the Ryan rule, is
a reference to the rules origins in the 1978 Fifth Circuit case, Ryan v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.43 The Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have been the traditional and strongest followers of this
approach.44 In these circuits, if a party appeals a partial adjudication by
43

Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum, 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978).
See Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992)
(denying an opportunity for plaintiff to appeal her third claim for relief dismissed with
prejudice after being denied Rule 54(b) certification, and voluntarily dismissing her first
two claims for relief without prejudice because the 10th Circuit, “agree[s] with the
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.”). The 10th Circuit explained that, “A plaintiff cannot be
allowed to . . . voluntarily dismiss[] . . . her remaining claims and then appeal[] the claim
that was dismissed with prejudice.” Id.; Rabbi Jacob Joseph Sch. v. Province of Mendoza,
425 F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[t]he court observed that “it is well settled in this Circuit
that, in general, a plaintiff cannot appeal an adverse decision on some claims by simply
voluntarily dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice.”) ((citing Chappelle v.
Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 1996) (acknowledging multiple views on
permitting appeal in the context of this article but ultimately stating that the court, “agree[d]
with those courts that have precluded an appeal from a dismissal of some of a plaintiffs
claims when the balance of his claims have been dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
Rule 41(a) dismissal of the action. A plaintiffs attempt to appeal a prior adverse
determination following the dismissal of his remaining claims without prejudice
necessarily implicates the policies of the final judgment rule.”)); see also Marshall v.
Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 499-500 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[t]he [p]laintiffs’ problem
with the strategy they employed is that it runs headlong into the ‘settled rule in the Fifth
Circuit that appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order cannot be created by dismissing
the remaining claims without prejudice.’ And, a Rule 41(a) dismissal without prejudice is
not deemed to be a ‘final decision’ for the purposes of § 1291. This rule can be traced back
to our decision in Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.”); Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253
(2d Cir. 2003); Swope v. Columbian Chemicals Co., 281 F.3d 185, 192-193 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“It is settled rule in the Fifth Circuit that appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order
cannot be created by dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice. This rule
originated in Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp . . . . hence, the Ryan rule requiring Rule
54(b) certification to create finality will not prevent an appeal where one is warranted.”);
State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 27-28 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The Court in Mesa agreed with the
Fifth Circuit in Ryan that voluntary dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining claim could not
be considered a “final decision” under § 1291 because a voluntarily dismissal is without
prejudice to the moving party filing those claims again . . . because plaintiffs never sought
or received a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification and, thus, never received
44
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dismissing non-adjudicated claims without prejudice, appellate courts will
deny the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in every instance.45
2. Per Se Rule
The next, and virtually opposite approach to finality is the Per Se
rule. A per se right to appeal provides that circuit courts exercise their
appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding the presence of virtually any form
of manufactured finality.46 This approach has been dubbed a per se right
to appeal based on Judge Emmitt Cox’s concurring opinion in the case
State Treasurer of the State of Mich. v. Barry.47 The First, Sixth, Eighth,
and D.C. Circuits have traditionally and to varying extents followed this
approach.48 In these circuits, if a party appeals a partial adjudication and
a final decision, plaintiffs had nothing to appeal . . . The Mesa court also emphasized Ryan’s
conclusion that ‘[i]n the absence of a rule 54(b) certification, the earlier decisions were not
appealable.’”); Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The plain language
of Rule 54(b) . . . [controls where] the court disposed of “fewer than all claims” on the
merits . . . Thus Rule 54(b), not § 1291, provides Plaintiffs’ with the means for appeal in
[that] case.”); cf. Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333, 1339
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 712-713(D.C. Circuit 2005)
(district court order granting summary judgment on some claims but dismissing the
remaining claim without prejudice subject to reconsideration was not a dismissal of the
action and was not final and appealable))(recognizing precedent which both accepts and
rejects manufactured finality, but denying jurisdiction in that case solely because the parties
dismissed the remaining claims by stipulation but without district court approval).
45 See supra note 44.
46 See infra note 48.
47 State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999)(Cox, J.,
concurring).
48 See Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2006) (“we conclude that the
voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims made the two earlier summary judgment orders
final for purposes of this appeal. After the voluntary dismissal, there was nothing left for
the district court to resolve, and the suit had ended as far as that court was concerned,
thereby creating a final judgment.”); Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc.,
412 F.3d 156, 158, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (permitting manufactured finality), cited in
Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3e 1333, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(which rejected manufactured finality, but declined to conclusively adjudicate the issue one
way or the other); J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc.,
76 F.3d 1245, 1250 (1st Cir. 1996); Hicks v. NLO, Inc., 825 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987)
(“Generally, where the trial court allows the plaintiff to dismiss his or her own action
without prejudice, the judgment is final for appeal purposes . . . [t]herefore, we hold that
plaintiff’s dismissal with the concurrence of the court of the only count of her complaint
which remained unadjudicated imparted finality to the District Court’s earlier order
granting summary judgment.”); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Thomas Auto Co., 939 F.2d 538
(8th Cir. 1991) (“[f]ollowing the granting of the motion for partial summary judgment, the
court, on the parties’ joint motion to dismiss and stipulation of dismissal filed pursuant to
[Rule] 41, dismissed without prejudice the remainder of the case. Chrysler Motors Corp.
v. Thomas Auto Co., No. LR-C-88-718 (E.D. Ark. Jul. 25, 1990) (order of dismissal). The
effect of that action was to make the judgment granting partial summary judgment a final
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dismisses non-adjudicated claims without prejudice, appellate courts will
exercise appellate jurisdiction.49
3. Discretionary Standard
The third approach applies a discretionary and manipulation–based
standard to manufactured finality, and is referred to as the Discretionary
Standard. This rule provides that circuit courts may review manufactured
final judgments, but only if there is an absence of intent to manipulate
appellate jurisdiction.50 Traditionally, only the Ninth and Federal Circuits
have followed this approach, although, others have occasionally used it in
some form, as well.51 Under this approach, if a party appeals a partial
judgment for purposes of appeal, even though the district court had not so certified under
[Rule] 54(b).”); Stewart v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 863 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Circuit
1988) (permitting manufactured finality although not directly addressing the issue in the
opinion); Merchants & Planters Bank v. Smith, 516 F.2d 355, 356 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975); cf.
Acton v. City of Columbia, Mo., 436 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2006) (disapproving of the
use of a dismissal without prejudice to create what is in substance an impermissible
interlocutory appeal, but noting that their prior case law did not foreclose that possibility);
Porter v. Williams, 436 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2006) (permitting manufactured finality);
Morris v. Crawford County, Ark., 299 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2002) (permitting
manufactured finality); Great Rivers Coop. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc.,
198 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[t]hough we strongly disapprove of this use of a
dismissal without prejudice to create what is in substance an impermissible interlocutory
appeal, our prior case law did not foreclose that effort here”).
49 See supra note 48.
50 See infra note 51.
51 See also James v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing a circuit split and advocating for allowing appeal of partial judgments after
dismissal of remaining claims without prejudice when there is an absence of intent to
manipulate appellate jurisdiction as evidenced by district court participation in the
dismissal, for example by continuing the statute of limitations and laches clocks on the
dismissed claims, as well as a lack of intent to circumvent Rule 54(b)); West v. Macht, 197
F.3d 1185, 1189 (7th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging inter- and intra-circuit conflict on whether
partial judgments can be appealed after dismissing remaining claims without prejudice, and
ruling that a plaintiff obtaining informa pauperis (IFP) status on some but not all claims
could not dismiss his viable claims to create a final judgment for purposes of appealing the
denials of IFP status); State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d
1102, 1105-06 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing appeal); Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 714715 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal); Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d
1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying appeal); United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884
(7th Cir. 1993); Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 957 F.2d 1431, 1433 (7th Cir. 1992)
(dismissing appeal); Cheng v. Commissioner, 878 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying
appeal); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing
appeal); Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984) (disallowing the appeal of orders
quashing writs of execution after appellants’ causes of action were dismissed for want of
prosecution); Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1979) (disallowing appeal
after class certification was denied and the appellants’ causes of action were dismissed for
want of prosecution); Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding an intent
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adjudication and dismisses non-adjudicated claims without prejudice, the
appellate court will accept or deny the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
depending on whether there is an intent to manipulate appellate
jurisdiction.52
B. Evaluation Criteria
Circuit courts throughout the country have grappled with the issue of
manufactured finality for many years, without Supreme Court guidance on
the issue. As a result, the case law has developed and been applied in a
variety of different ways leading to circuit splits53 and in some cases, intracircuit divides.54 Nonetheless, there have been several important
to manipulate appellate jurisdiction: after a party sought Rule 54(b) certification but was
denied, the party dismissed the remaining claims without informing the district court, filed
a simultaneous appeal and before the appeal was even considered, re-filed the dismissed
portion as a separate lawsuit); Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538
F.2d 1264, 1266 n.1 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (allowing appeal); see also infra notes
63-66, 217 (acknowledging a more recent and open use of the standard by the Eighth
Circuit and de facto uses of the standard in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits). But see JTC
Petroleum Co. v. Plasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 1999); International
Marketing Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 192 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 1999); Fassett
v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting appeal of partial
judgment after the statute of limitations had run on remaining claims, but finding,
nonetheless, that an expired statute of limitations is not required for permitting appeal);
Cape May Green, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1983) (granting the plaintiff the
right to appeal after losing on all its claims against all the defendants even when one of the
defendants dismissed its cross-claim against another defendant without prejudice); Charles
Alan Wright, et al., 15A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.8, at 623-26 (2d ed.
1992 & Supp. 1999). See generally Doe v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(citing Nystrom v. TREX Co., 339 F.3d 1347, (Fed. Cir. 2003) (where the Federal Circuit
identified several paths to appellate review of a partial judgment including: proceeding to
trial, seeking Rule 54(b) certification, dismissal without prejudice of remaining claims, and
1292 (b) review)) (allowing appeal of a partial judgment after dismissal of remaining
claims without prejudice).
52 See supra note 51; see also infra notes 141–47 (listing criteria).
53
See supra notes 44–51.
54 See generally supra notes 39, 43, 46 and infra notes 189, 216-24. The Second
Circuit has traditionally followed Ryan, but recently permitted conditional finality. The
Third Circuit has recognized manufactured finality in earlier opinions, and more recently
rejected manufactured and conditional finality. The Fifth Circuit originated the Ryan rule,
but has recognized certain exceptions and permitted manufactured finality, as well as
appeals of claims dismissed with conditions that amount to “legal prejudice.” The Sixth
Circuit has traditionally followed a Per Se approach, but recently rejected conditional
finality. The Seventh Circuit has recently followed the Ryan rule, rejected conditional
finality, but permitted manufactured finality in the past. The Eighth Circuit has in some
cases used what appears to be forms of the Ryan, Per Se, and Discretionary Standard
approaches. The Ninth Circuit used a Discretionary Standard as of 2002, but originally
rejected manufactured finality, and currently rejects conditional finality. The Eleventh
Circuit has been a traditional follower of the Ryan rule, but has recently acknowledged
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overlapping factors courts consider regardless of which rule they apply in
their circuit.
Below is a comparison of the three approaches based upon seven of
those factors. Specifically the section below examines the three
approaches to manufactured finality in light of: (1) the circuits’ varying
philosophies towards the final judgment rule; (2) interplay with Rule
54(b); (3) piecemeal litigation; (4) the effect on district courts; (5) the
effect on appellate courts; (6) the effect on party rights; and (7) the
treatment of conditional finality.
Each is addressed in turn and in certain cases, when appropriate, the
rules are compared and contrasted individually, in groups, or by
membership in a group category.
1. The Final Judgment Rule: Strict versus Pragmatic Finality
a. The Ryan Rule: Strict Finality
28 U.S.C Section 1291 states that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall
have jurisdiction of appeal from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States . . . .”55 A strict view of finality, as used in jurisdictions
following the Ryan rule, is based on the historic understanding that a final
judgment only exists if all claims have been decided on the merits or
dismissed with prejudice.56
As a textual endeavor, proponents of a strict finality rationale have
emphasized the word final in “final decision” and “final judgment rule” as
justification for rejection of all forms of manufactured finality.57 This
certain exceptions and permitted manufactured finality in those limited cases. The D.C.
Circuit has not taken a definitive stance, but recently rejected manufactured finality where
the parties dismissed their claims without court approval, but has permitted the practice in
other instances.
55 28 U.S.C § 1291 (2013).
56
Cf. THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS, § 3.02 Final-Decision Requirement, ( Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009)
(acknowledging that a complete emphasis on the word “final” in final decision or the final
judgment rule in § 1291 leads to a strict interpretation of finality, which requires district
court proceedings to proceed to termination before appellate review). Mr. Baker also
recognizes, however, that a complete emphasis on the word “decision” in “final decision”
would lead to the opposite extreme, where every district court ruling would be appealable.
Id. The author ultimately concludes a proper interpretation of finality is one that strikes a
balance between these two opposite views. Id.
57 See id.; see also State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 14 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citing Chapelle v. Beacon Comm’s Corp., 84 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 1996); Cook v.
Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1992)) (“Ryan’s rule is sound,
consistent with § 1291, which provides for appellate jurisdiction over only a ‘final
decision,’ and is followed by two other circuits.”).
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view is based on faithfulness to a historic and ‘true’ concept of finality in
line with the traditional idea that an appellate court’s work begins only
after there is a complete and final adjudication of all claims on the merits
by the district court.58 The Supreme Court has held that a decision is not
final unless it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.”59
Applying this rationale, a rejection of manufactured finality is not
surprising. When parties dismiss non-adjudicated claims without
prejudice, the claims may be re-filed, as long as the statute of limitations
has not expired.60 As a result, according to this view, as long as the claims
can be re-filed, the district court’s job is not yet complete, appellate review
is premature, and there is no truly “final judgment.”.61
Nonetheless, even though some have argued Ryan is clear, the strict
finality rationale has been inconsistently applied.62 For example, in cases
where non-adjudicated claims are dismissed without prejudice before a
partial adjudication, as opposed to after, the appellate courts have
exercised jurisdiction. This has happened, even though the dismissed
claims could still technically be re-filed.63 Similarly, exceptions to strict
58

See BAKER, supra note 56.
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 232 (1945).
60 Barry, 168 F.3d at 12 (citing Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22 (11th Cir. 1995)).
In Barry, the 11th Circuit recognized that
The Court in Mesa agreed with the Fifth Circuit in Ryan that voluntary
dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining claim could not be considered a ‘final
decision’ under § 1291 because a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice to
the moving party filing those claims again . . . The Court in Mesa reasoned
that no final decision had been entered, because the remaining claim, which
was dismissed without prejudice, could be resurrected . . . . Dismissing the
appeal in Construction Aggregates for lack of jurisdiction, this Court held that
there was no final decision from which to appeal, in light of the defendant’s
ability to re-file its second counterclaim, which had been dismissed without
prejudice.
Id. (citing Construction Aggregate, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334 (11th
Cir. 1998)); see also id. at 13 (“The parties, and the concurrence here, advocate that a
dismissal without prejudice is a ‘good pillar to support implied final judgment under Jetco.’
We disagree . . . in Jetco, the two orders left nothing that could be re-filed, [but] if the
appeal failed in Mesa or Ryan, the plaintiff could re-file other claims.”).
61 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 12 (citing Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22 (11th Cir.
1995)).
62 See infra notes 63–67.
63 See e.g., Schoenfeld v. Babbit, 168 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 1999). In Schoenfeld, the
plaintiff brought causes of action for gender discrimination against two government
officials after failing to get a position at the United States Department of the Interior, Fish
and Wildlife Services. Id. at 1265–66. The plaintiff dismissed each causes of action against
one of the defendants without prejudice, and later lost on the second defendant’s motion
for summary judgment covering all remaining counts in the complaint. Id. In deciding there
was jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the adverse summary judgment ruling, the court
59
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finality have been made for dismissals of entire actions without
prejudice,64 dismissals without prejudice of claims due to misjoinder,65 and
in cases involving dismissals of non-adjudicated claims without prejudice
due to a lack of an indispensable party66 or due to a party’s desire to litigate
those claims in state courts.67
b. The Per Se & Discretionary Standard Rules: Pragmatic Finality
In contrast to the Ryan approach, the Per Se and discretionary rules
openly apply a pragmatic and policy–based approach to finality.68 Circuits
using this approach have emphasized that, ultimately, the final judgment
rule is a rule, designed to balance the underlying competing policy
interests of finality – the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on
the one hand, and the danger of denying justice by delaying appellate
review on the other.69 As for the pragmatic considerations, these
reasoned that because “[S]choenfeld dismissed the claim against [the first defendant]
without prejudice [and] before the district court entered the order granting summary
judgment [in favor of the second defendant] . . . [t]he district court order granting summary
judgment adjudicated all the claims against all the remaining parties[;]” thus, “[t]here
was . . . no reason for the district court to even consider . . . Rule 54(b).” Id. The court
then found that the situation was “distinct from the one covered by Ryan . . . .” Id. at 1266.
64 LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding an appealable
final judgment despite the fact that an entire action was voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice by the plaintiff’s attorney after the plaintiff went missing, because the dismissal
was subject to conditions imposed by the district court which amounted to the requisite
“legal prejudice” needed for finality); see also Kirkland v. National Mortg. Network, Inc.,
884 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1989) (allowing appeal of an order revoking attorney’s pro hac
vice status where the party dismissed its entire action without prejudice). In Kirkland, the
lead plaintiff in a class action brought claims for an alleged violation of the Truth-inLending Act, as well as other causes of action stemming from a $15,000 loan made by a
national mortgage company to the plaintiff. Id. at 1369. In the course of the litigation, the
district court revoked the lead plaintiff’s attorney’s pro hac vice status. Id. Later, the
plaintiffs obtained a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal (with court approval) of their entire action
without prejudice. Id. at 1367-68. After the dismissal, the attorney sought appellate review
of the district court’s pro hac vice revocation. Id. In that case, the circuit court found the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the revocation order was proper because a dismissal
without prejudice is a final judgment. Id.
65 See Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2010).
66 See Equity Inv. Partners, Lp v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2010).
67 See Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2012).
68 The Supreme Court has recognized a pragmatic approach to finality. See Brown
Shoes Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). In that case the court stated:
The Court has adopted essentially practical tests for identifying those
judgments which are, and those which are not, to be considered “final.” A
pragmatic approach to the question of finality has been considered essential
to the achievement of the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action,”: the touchstones of federal procedure. Id. (citations omitted).
69 See id.
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jurisdictions have also recognized the final judgment rule creates a
division of labor between district and appellate courts, and that
manufactured finality still creates a final judgment in the sense that there
is “nothing for the court to do but execute judgment.”70 These jurisdictions
balance the historic concerns against premature appeals against the
potential injustice that can result from denying appellate review of a
manufactured final judgment.71
In practice, appellate courts advancing pragmatic finality have still
placed limits on judgments manufactured for finality by exercising
jurisdiction only where remaining claims are dismissed with the district
court’s approval, and are subject to the statute of limitations.72 Even in
70

See also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); Marianne Fogarty, The
Finality of Partial Orders in Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
637, 644 nn. 52-53 (1988), (describing the avenues under § 1292(a)-(b) to appeal, and
judicially created exceptions to the final judgment rule including: (1) The All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982); (2) the Cohen collateral order doctrine, Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); (3) the Forgay doctrine, Forgay v.
Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204-06; (4) the Wood doctrine, United States v. Wood, 295
F.3d 772, 776-78 (5th Cir. 1977); and (5) the death knell doctrine, Jetco Elec. Indus. V.
Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973)); cf. THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE
JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, § 3.01 Appeals From Final Decisions –
Civil, (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009) (“Functionally, the [finality] requirement structures
the relationship between appellate court and trial court; within this relationship, each court
performs its complementary role.”).
71 See American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 892 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting). According to the dissent in Dastar Corp.,
What the majority ignore[d] is that the inquiry into whether a decision is final
requires evaluation of the competing considerations underlying all questions
of finality — ‘the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one
hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.’ Our own
pragmatic approach to the issue of finality recognizes these competing
considerations by allowing parties to voluntarily dismiss claims without
prejudice prior to appeal, absent a finding of manipulation. Thus, the purpose
of such a dismissal is to support efficiency, not undermine it.
Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)) (citing
James v. Price Stern, 283 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)).
72 See e.g., Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (declining to decide the issue of manufactured finality conclusively, but denying
jurisdiction in that case because a lack of district court approval); see also Hicks v. NLO,
Inc., 825 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Therefore, we hold that plaintiff’s dismissal with
the concurrence of the court of the only count of her complaint which remained
unadjudicated imparted finality to the District Court’s earlier order granting summary
judgment.”); cf. supra note 38 (acknowledging situations where courts grant jurisdiction
notwithstanding dismissals without prejudice in Ryan jurisdictions because the statute of
limitations has expired on the claims dismissed). See generally State Treasurer of State of
Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 20-21 (11th Cir. 1999) (Cox, J., concurring) (“Voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is not, after all, a freebie from the litigant’s point of view.
When the litigant re-files [sic] the claims, he could face meritorious statute-of limitations
arguments . . . ).
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Discretionary Standard review cases where other factors are present,
courts have focused on these two factors.73
Nonetheless, in some Per Se and Discretionary Standard cases, the
failure of the district court to approve the dismissals has neither been
dispositive, nor an absolute bar to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.74
For example circuit courts have exercised appellate jurisdiction over
unilateral dismissals without prejudice made as a matter of right using
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which can only be used if an opponent has not yet
filed an answer or motion for summary judgment.75
On the other hand, the majority of Per Se and Discretionary Standard
jurisdictions have taken a hard–line stance to ensure that the statute of
limitations continues to run on any non-adjudicated claims dismissed
without prejudice.76 As a result, in cases involving any impediment to the
statute of limitations, even for a limited period of time, the courts in Per
Se and Discretionary Standard jurisdictions generally find manipulation
and decline to exercise jurisdiction.77 The practical affect of this approach
is to deny appellate jurisdiction to dismissals made with “conditional
prejudice,” where dismissals of non adjudicated claims “without
prejudice” become “with prejudice,” but only if a party’s appeal of
adjudicated claims is unsuccessful. Conditional dismissals admittedly
interrupt the statute of limitations clock during the pendency of appeals.78
More recently additional limitations have been put in place, as some
panels using a pragmatic view of finality have declined appellate
73

See also Romoland School Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy, 548 F.3d 738, 748 (9th
Cir. 2010); Doe v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348, 1352-54 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasizing
statute of limitations as barrier to refiling); James v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064,
1065-1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing statute of limitations and district court participation
as factors weighing in favor of granting jurisdiction); Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks
Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting jurisdiction in part due to mitigation of statute
of limitations risk); Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying
jurisdiction where there was no district court approval of the dismissals without prejudice).
See generally Sneller v. Bainbridge Island, 606 F.3d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 2010).
74 See Duke Energy Trading & Marketing v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1048-50 (9th Cir.
2001) (granting jurisdiction even without district court approval where dismissed claims
were refiled in state courts); see also State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene,
164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999) (granting jurisdiction even without district court approval of
claims dismissed without prejudice where claims were re-filed in a state court).
75 See Duke, 267 F.3d at 1048-50; Coeur D’Alene, 164 F.3d 1102.
76 Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. and Snap Prepaid, LLC v. Owl Wireless, LLC, NO. 124551, NO. 12-4565 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2013) (rejecting conditional dismissals for
undermining the concept of finality, Rule 54(b) and Section 1292, contributing to
successive appeals, and avoiding statute of limitations risks). See generally supra notes 7273.
77
See generally id.
78 See generally id.
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jurisdiction in complex-multi-party cases, and in situations involving
deceptive multi-step dismissals.79
2. Rule 54(b)
When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action
as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
the parties’ rights and liabilities.80

a. Ryan Rule: Preserving Rule 54(b)
Despite the Ryan rule’s strict finality rationale, adherents argue that
the rule is not unreasonable because of the availability of Rule 54(b) for
early appellate review.81 In fact, a strong justification for the Ryan rule is
based on a desire to prevent parties from avoiding and undermining Rule
54(b) through the use of manufactured finality.82 For example, the Tenth
Circuit has found:
79

See American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp, 318 F.3d 881, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2003).
FED R. CIV. P. 54(B).
81 See infra note 82.
82 State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 14–16 (11th Cir. 1999).
In Barry, the majority found:
Our precedent guides our conclusion that exercising jurisdiction here ‘would
undermine the policies of judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal litigation,
and district court independence that are the basis of the final judgment
rule’ . . . [r]repealing Ryan’s rule significantly erodes Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b)
allows the district court to control its docket and to make an independent
determination whether an exception to the final decision rule is warranted in
an individual case under appropriate circumstances . . . what is not conjecture
is that abrogation of Ryan’s rule will subvert Rule 54(b) and result in the
parties, not the trial court’s, controlling what interim orders are appealed and
when . . . [o]ne countervailing concern is ‘the specter of repeated appeals by
litigants who dismiss claims in order to appeal and then resurrect them on
remand in another action.
80

[T]his circuit’s bright-line rule fosters predictability . . . [t]he final decision
rule is well known and longstanding. It is clear, easy to follow, and promotes
judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal appeals. Most importantly, the rule
as it stands today is consistent with Rule 54(b), is faithful to the statutory
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A plaintiff cannot be allowed to undermine the requirements of
Rule 54(b) by seeking voluntary dismissal of her remaining claims
and then appealing the claim that was dismissed with prejudice.
[The plaintiff] has attempted to subvert the requirements of Rule
54(b) by voluntarily dismissing her first and second claims when
the district court would not grant certification on her third claim
for relief. 83

The essence of the argument is that by allowing parties to
manufacture finality, they obtain an end-around Rule 54(b).84 This is
because they can always dismiss non-adjudicated claims without
prejudice, obtain appellate review, and avoid having to satisfying Rule
54(b)’s two main requirements: (1) that the adjudicated claim is a
“separate claim for relief”; and (2) that there is “no just reason for delay”
of the adjudicated claim’s review.85
b. Per Se and Discretionary Standard: Manufactured Finality as a
Complement to Rule 54(b).
Although it is true that manufactured finality creates an alternate
route to appellate review, it may be unfair to characterize the route as an
“end-around.” Rule 54(b) appeals are still the only “risk-free” way a party
can have its cake and it eat it too – that is, obtain appellate review for the
partial adjudication while simultaneously continuing pursuit of any nonadjudicated claims at the district court.86 This is because manufactured
finality carries statute of limitations risks for non-adjudicated claims
dismissed without prejudice while Rule 54(b) does not.
In this way, manufactured finality comes with fewer disadvantages
in comparison to Rule 54(b) than anticipated.87 In some cases, parties will
language and policies underlying § 1291, and allows the district courts to
retain control of their dockets.
Id.; see also Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (“Were we to permit the parties’ dismissal without prejudice to generate an
appealable judgment, we would effectively transfer to the litigants the “dispatcher”
function that Rule 54(b) vests in the district courts.”); Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767
(10th Cir. 1998) (“Thus Rule 54(b), not § 1291, provides Plaintiffs [sic] with the means for
appeal in this case.”).
83 Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992)
(following Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978)).
84 See supra notes 82–83.
85 See supra notes 82–83.
86 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 20 (11th Cir. 1999).
87 See James C. Martin & Jayne E. Fleming, Can You or Can’t You: Review of Partial
Judgments Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(B), ABA APP. PRAC. J. Vol.
XXV, No. 1 (Spring 2006). The authors acknowledge that Rule 54(b) jurisprudence
involve substantial analysis to determine if there is “more than one claim for relief” and
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be best served by “proving” their desire for appellate review by taking the
risk that any non-adjudicated claims dismissed without prejudice will be
lost due to the statute of limitations, unlike situations where appellate
review is obtained through Rule 54(b), where the statute of limitations risk
of losing non-adjudicated claims is not present.88
3. Judicial Efficiency & Piecemeal Litigation
Two of the most historic and significant considerations in appellate
procedure are judicial efficiency and piecemeal litigation.89 In this article,
“no just reason for delay.” Circuits vary on how to determine if there is more than one
claim for relief. Some circuits look at the degree of factual overlap between claims, others
look to the nature of relief sought by the claims, and others determine if treating the claims
separately would be contrary to claim-splitting rules. Some circuits look at the similarity
of legal and factual issues. The authors note that the “no just cause for delay” standard is
also a subject of controversy. At a minimum, “[t]he bare recitation of the “no just cause
for delay” standard found in the text of Rule 54(b) is not sufficient, by itself, to properly
certify an issue for immediate appeal.” Instead appellate courts are forced to look at the
district court record and consider factors such as the judiciary’s administrative interests,
the parties equitable considerations, and whether granting certification will allow the
circuit courts to avoid having to determine: (1) the same issue more than once; (2) any
questions that remain at the trial court; and (3) any issues that will become moot by future
developments in the case. Id. Rule 54(b) jurisprudence also treats judgments determining
liability but not damages differently depending on the circuit. The Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have ruled judgments are not final if they decide only
liability and leave open the question of relief. The Seventh circuit follows this general rule,
but creates an exception, allowing a finality designation in cases where the computation of
damages is mechanical and unlikely to produce another appeal. Despite following the
general rule against considering liability findings without damages determinations final,
the Fifth circuit has ruled an order requiring a defendant to pay the plaintiff royalties was
a final judgment – even though the district court failed to quantify the amount of royalties
owed. Id.; see also Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(B): Seventy-Five And Ready For
Retirement, 65 FL. L.REV. 711, 714-17 (2013)(arguing that Rule 54(B) should be “retired”
in favor of a discretionary approach because there is uncertainty about what constitutes a
separate claim, the level of articulation necessary to obtain certification, and disagreement
about the standards to be applied with the rule and that a lack of Supreme Court clarification
and attention to the rule has led parties to over-aggressively appeal for fear of losing
appellate rights, and on the other extreme, to sitting on appellate rights and losing the ability
to appeal.).
88 See supra note 87.
89 See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). The Court
found in that case:
[The] struggle of the courts [is] sometimes to devise a formula that will
encompass all situations and at other times to take hardship cases out from
under the rigidity of previous declarations; sometimes choosing one and
sometimes another of the considerations that always compete in the question
of appealability, the most important of which are the inconvenience and costs
of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by
delay on the other.
Id.; see also Schoenfeld v. Babbit, 168 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 1999).
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piecemeal litigation is a reference to the filing and re-filing of claims in
different district courts.90 Piecemeal appeals on the other hand, involve
the concern that parties will continuously appeal district court
adjudications on a repeated and continuous basis.91
a. Horizontal Piecemeal Litigation
i. The Ryan Rule & Horizontal Piecemeal Litigation Concerns
Perhaps the biggest advantage claimed by advocates of the Ryan rule
is the prevention of horizontal piecemeal litigation.92 Specifically, the rule
prevents parties from dismissing non-adjudicated claims without prejudice
and re-filing them in another district court.93
Instead, parties seeking appellate review in Ryan jurisdictions can
dismiss non-adjudicated claims with prejudice, litigate non-adjudicated
claims to resolution, or obtain a Rule 54(b) certificate for early appellate
review.94 Nonetheless, whether the parties dismiss with prejudice, litigate
remaining claims to finality, or obtain Rule 54(b) approval, the path to
appellate review prevents a party from re-filing non-adjudicated claims in
a different district court; thus, entirely eliminating horizontal piecemeal
litigation concerns.95
ii. The Per Se & Discretionary Standards: Manufactured Finality &
Horizontal Piecemeal Litigation Concerns
On the other hand, in Per Se and Discretionary Standard
jurisdictions, which permit manufactured finality, there is a risk of
horizontal piecemeal litigation.96 Although in some, if not many or most
cases, practical, common sense, and statute of limitations concerns will
temper the decision to re-file non-adjudicated claims dismissed without
prejudice there is still the potential for abuse of manufactured finality.97
For example, imagine a party has manufactured a final judgment to
obtain appellate review, and then immediately re-filed its non-adjudicated
90

This is essentially the re-filing concern.
This is the concern that appeals will be filed too early, and that cases will reappear
before the appellate courts multiple times for multiple different reasons.
92 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 12 (citing Mesa v.
United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22 (11th Cir. 1995))..
93 See id.
94 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 14-15 (11th Cir. 1999).
95 If the remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice, that is considered an
adjudication on the merits, and the claims are lost. See generally id.
96
See infra notes 98–115.
97 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 20–21 (Cox, J., concurring).
91
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claims in a different state or federal court. The party has not only avoided
the requirements of Rule 54(b), but also successfully shopped for a new
district court to hear its non-adjudicated claims while simultaneously
obtaining appellate review.
A nuanced variation of this scenario took place in State of Missouri
ex. Rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe.98 In Coeur D’Alene, the State of
Missouri sued the Coeur D’Alene tribe and a privately affiliated
corporation in Missouri state court.99 The State of Missouri alleged the
two defendants conducted an unlawful Internet gambling program with
Missouri residents in violation of Missouri state gambling laws.100
The tribe and its affiliate removed the case to a federal district court
in Missouri, and successfully prevented a remand back to state court. The
tribe was also able to have all claims against it dismissed based on the
doctrine of tribal immunity.101 The claims against the other defendant
were not dismissed however, because the district court refused to extend
tribal immunity to a tribal agent.102
Soon after, the State of Missouri dismissed its non-adjudicated
claims against the tribal affiliate without prejudice and appealed the
district court’s orders denying remand and granting the Coeur D’Alene
tribal immunity.103 With the appeal pending, the State of Missouri then
re-filed its non-adjudicated claims against the tribe’s affiliate in a separate
state court action, this time adding two tribal leaders. The tribal affiliate
removed the case again, and eventually had the action transferred to the
same federal district court which presided over the State of Missouri’s
original suit.104 Even after being aware of the State of Missouri’s dismissal
and re-filing of the non-adjudicated claims against the tribal affiliate, the
Eighth Circuit exercised appellate jurisdiction and reviewed the district
court’s orders denying remand and granting the Coeur D’Alene tribal
immunity.105
A similar “re-filing” scenario also took place in Fletcher v.
Gagosian.106 In that case, the plaintiffs were court-appointed trustees of a
California corporation undergoing bankruptcy.107 After plaintiffs filed an
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1105.
Id.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Coeur D’Alene, 164 F.3d at 1110.
Id.
Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 638–39.
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amended two-count complaint against multiple defendants for insider
trading, the district court dismissed the first count of the complaint and a
single defendant from the second count.108 The plaintiffs sought Rule
54(b) and Section 1292(b) interlocutory appeals of the district court’s
adjudications, but both were denied.109
Soon after, the plaintiffs manufactured finality by dismissing the
non-adjudicated portions of the complaint without prejudice.110 A notice
of appeal followed.111 Similar to Coeur D’Alene, the plaintiffs dismissed
their complaint without court approval invoking Rule 41(a)(1), which
permits voluntary dismissals of non-adjudicated claims without prejudice
as a matter of right if no answer or motion for summary judgment has yet
been filed in a case.112 The plaintiffs then re-filed their dismissed claims
as a separate lawsuit. 113 Unlike the Eighth Circuit however, the Ninth
Circuit, declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction.114 The court explained:
[I]f we accept appellants’ rationale, then we also accept the notion
that the policies against multiplicity of litigation and against
piecemeal appeals may be avoided at the whim of a plaintiff. He
need merely dismiss portions of his complaint without prejudice,
appeal from what had been an interlocutory order, and re-file the
dismissed portion as a separate lawsuit. That is precisely what
appellants did here.115

Overall, even if situations like Coeur D’Alene and Gagosian are
uncommon, left “unregulated,” manufactured finality has the potential to
seriously undermine district courts, and create unacceptable risks of
horizontal piecemeal litigation.116
b. Vertical Piecemeal Litigation
i. The Ryan Rule & Vertical Piecemeal Litigation Concerns
Traditionally, the Ryan rule is known for enhancing judicial
efficiency while reducing and or entirely eliminating the risk that a party
108

Id.
Id.
110 Id.
111 Fletcher, 604 F.2d at 638–39.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 639.
116
See State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir.
1999); Fletcher, 604 F.2d 637.
109
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may file successive appeals and invoke appellate review of bits and pieces
of district court rulings.117
Proponents of the Ryan rule point out that in order to obtain early
appellate review, parties have two options even if Rule 54(b) review is
denied.
First, parties can dismiss non-adjudicated claims with
prejudice.118 Second, they litigate non-adjudicated claims to their
resolution at the trial court.119 In both cases, there is concern that appellate
courts will be bothered by multiple appeals from issues arising in the same
case.120
ii. The Per Se & Discretionary Standards & Vertical Piecemeal
Litigation Concerns
Although the arguments in the immediately preceding section may
be technically true, the issue of piecemeal litigation shouldn’t be viewed
in a vacuum.
First, in situations where a party’s peripheral non-adjudicated claims
are intended to supplement and “bolster” an adjudicated claim, litigating

117 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 16 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“Lastly, this Circuit has followed Ryan ‘s rule for almost twenty-five years. Any
procedural rule will engender policy arguments and the final decision rule is no exception.
The final decision rule is well known and longstanding. It is clear, easy to follow, and
promotes judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal appeals.”).
118 See id. at 15. The majority found:
Instead, if a Rule 54(b) certificate is denied, Ryan’s rule forces litigants to
make hard choices and seriously evaluate their cases. The parties must assess
the likelihood of a reversal of the adjudicated claims on appeal versus the
likelihood of success on the remaining claims at trial. While some claims in
lawsuits are close, many are not. Litigants often have to make much more
difficult choices in the course of complex litigation. In order to appeal a
court’s rulings on some claims, a party may settle the remaining claims in
some fashion and dismiss them with prejudice. Such a settlement might even
incorporate a high or low amount on the remaining claims dismissed with
prejudice, contingent upon the outcome of the appeal. As the concurrence
notes, perhaps the remaining claims are not winners on their merits, but only
offered other tactical advantages. A party seeking an appeal either has to give
up that tactical advantage to gain the benefit of finality or has to convince the
other party to do so. In fact, the options of resolving the dilemma faced by the
parties are endless and only limited by the settlement creativity of the parties.
Id.
119 See id. at 20 (Cox, J, concurring).
120 If the remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice, the only appeal will be of the
partial judgment. On the other hand, if the remaining claims are adjudicated to resolution
at the district court, appeal of the partial judgment and any remaining claims will be a part
of a traditional final judgment.
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the non-adjudicated claims to resolution is an inefficient use of judicial
resources if the adjudicated claim is ultimately lost.121
For example, in cases involving third-party liability or cases
involving indemnification, a defendant’s claims against a third-party
defendant may only be relevant if the defendant is still potentially liable
for the underlying cause of action.122 In the case that a defendant prevails
on summary judgment against a plaintiff and an appellate court affirms
that decision, there would be no reason to pursue a third-party complaint
against a third-party defendant for indemnification or contribution.123 In
those cases, early appellate review is the missing ingredient necessary for
the parties to make a meaningful choice about the pursuit of nonadjudicated peripheral claims to trial.
Second, in Ryan circuits, without the option of manufacturing
finality, early appellate review requires Rule 54(b) approval or the use of
an alternative appellate doctrine. But Rule 54(b) and its alternatives are
merely codified versions of vertical piecemeal litigation, since district
court proceedings on the non-adjudicated claims continue while the
appellate court reviews an adjudicated claim.124 Rule 54(b) and its
alternatives also carry the risk of successive appeals, because appellate
courts may be required to review non-adjudicated claims later decided by
the district court.
Third, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41 acts as a built in
barrier to the risk of successive appeals. That rule provides that voluntary
121

See Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 20 (Cox, J, concurring). Judge Cox clarified that:
Ryan ignores the legitimate reasons that a litigant may opt for a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice over further proceedings or a dismissal with
prejudice. Most obviously, the demise of some claims may have “orphaned”
the rest. For example, the remaining claim may share an element with the
resolved claims; a conclusion that no evidence exists to support the common
element may sound the tocsin on the remaining claim. Or perhaps the
remaining claim was a setoff or a “defensive counterclaim,” one that the
defendant would not have bothered to bring had the plaintiff not picked a
fight. Or maybe the claim (like some RICO claims) was not a winner on the
merits, but offered other tactical advantages (such as wide-ranging discovery
or a chance to blacken the opponent).
Id. (Cox, J. concurring).
See also Barry L. Pickens & Loyd Gattis, The Finality Trap Revisited, SPENCER FANE
(March 23, 2010), http://www.spencerfane.com/The-Finality-Trap-Revisited-03-23-2010/
(recognizing the tough decision about handling supplementary claims upon an adverse
partial judgment and the finality trap).
122 Cf. supra note 120.
123 Cf. supra note 120.
124 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 20 (Cox, J, concurring) (“Even if the litigant obtains an
appeal, the Rule 54(b) route comes at a cost to finality. That is because, notwithstanding
even an affirmance on appeal, the case is still pending below.”).
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dismissals of claims without prejudice and without court approval on more
than occasion, results in an adjudication on the merits. This means that
even in a Per Se jurisdiction, a party that unilaterally dismisses nonadjudicated claims on more than one occasion will be barred from
obtaining appellate review for those non-adjudicated claims.125 In light of
this fact, the risk of successive appeals stemming from manufactured
finality is overstated.
Overall, appellate review of judgments manufactured for finality
involve less vertical piecemeal litigation than judgments approved for
Rule 54(b) review. This is because Rule 54(b) is really a codified approval
of simultaneous district and appellate court litigation, and because
judgments manufactured for finality carry the risks that non adjudicated
claims will be lost due to the expiration of the statute of limitations or the
denial of appellate jurisdiction due to manipulation.126
4. District Courts
The Supreme Court has observed:
[The final judgment rule] emphasizes the deference that appellate
courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon
to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the
course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine
125

Fed. R. Civ. P 41. Section (a)(1)(B) of the rule states that for voluntary dismissals
without prejudice and without court approval, a second voluntary dismissal acts as an
adjudication on the merits:
(a) Voluntary Dismissal.
(1) By the Plaintiff.
(A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and
any applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a
court order by filing:
(i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or
a motion for summary judgment; or
(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.
(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is
without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or
state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal
operates as an adjudication on the merits.
(2) By Court Order; Effect. Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action
may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that
the court considers proper. If a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before
being served with the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action may be
dismissed over the defendant’s objection only if the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication. Unless the order states otherwise, a
dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.
Id.
126 See generally supra notes 72–73.
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the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role
that individual plays in our judicial system.127

a. Ryan Rule and District Court Authority
One of the strongest rationales for the Ryan rule is preserving district
court authority and integrity.128 This is because the rule prevents parties
from dismissing non-adjudicated claims without prejudice and later refiling them in a different district court.129 As seen in the section above,
this concern is grounded in much more than theory.130
b. Per Se and Discretionary Standard Rules and District Court
Authority
Nonetheless, re-filing concerns may be overstated. As an initial
matter, the Discretionary Standard includes re-filing of dismissed claims
as a factor showing manipulation.131 As seen in Fletcher, circuits using a
Discretionary Standard can deny jurisdiction if there is a re-filing concern,
unlike circuits applying a Per Se rule, as in Couer D’Alene, where the
circuit court accepted appellate jurisdiction over a partial adjudication,
despite the plaintiff’s decision to re-file non-adjudicated claims dismissed
without prejudice in state court.132
Setting aside re-filing concerns where non-adjudicated claims are
dismissed without district court approval, when dismissals of remaining
claims are made with a district court’s approval, manufactured finality can
provide a valuable and desirable added option to the district court’s for
when they choose to bless a judgment for appellate review. For example,
and ironically, in Ryan, the district court in that case certified a judgment
for Rule 54(b) review, reversed its approval, and permitted the parties to
manufacture finality.133 This option also comes with added docket clearing

127

Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999) (citing Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981)).
128 State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Our
precedent guides our conclusion that exercising jurisdiction here ‘would undermine the
policies of judicial efficency, avoiding piecemeal litigation, and district court independence
that are the basis of the final judgment rule.’”).
129 See supra notes 98–115; see also Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 12.
130 See supra notes 98–115.
131 See generally Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (1979).
132 Id.
133
See Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978) cited in Cook
v. Rocky Mountain, 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992).
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benefits since the dismissed claims may never return – unlike Rule 54(b)
appeals where non-adjudicated claims remain with the district court.134
There is also reason to believe this added option, when exercised
with district court approval, will boost district court authority in
comparison to Rule 54(b). This is because, satisfying Rule 54(b)’s twopart requirement has been confusing and difficult for district courts to
apply, leading to situations where appellate review has been denied despite
a district court’s certification.135
5. The Appellate Courts
a. The Ryan & Per Se Rules & Appellate Courts
Although the Ryan and Per Se rules are opposites in that one rejects
and the other accepts manufactured finality, they share the common trait
of uniformity and low procedural review costs.136 In contrast to the
Discretionary Standard which requires appellate courts to comb the record
for manipulative intent, both the Ryan and Per Se rules either uniformly
deny or grant parties the right to manufacture appellate review of a final
judgment.137
One area where the rules, of course, end up differing, however, are
their respective effects on appellate court dockets. The Per Se approach
will likely increase them, while the Ryan rule will likely control them and
keep them steady.138
b. The Discretionary Standard Rule & Appellate Courts
As the approach which places the greatest amount of added
responsibility on the appellate courts, the discretionary rule comes with
procedural review costs and increased appellate court involvement in cases
134 Cf. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 20 (Cox, J, concurring) (“Even if the litigant obtains an
appeal, the Rule 54(b) route comes at a cost to finality. That is because, notwithstanding
even an affirmance on appeal, the case is still pending below.”).
135 E.g., Taco John’s of Huron, Inc. v. Bix Produce Co. 569 F.3d 401, 402 (8th Cir.
2009); Ebrahimi c. City of Huntsville Bd. Of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 167 (11th Cir. 1997);
Nichols v. Cadle Co., 101 F.3d 1448, 1449 (1st Cir. 1996); Brandt v. Bassett (In re Sc.
Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1550 (11th Cir. 1995); Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1444 (7th Cir. 1988); Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts College 843
F.2d 38, 44–46 (1st Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986). These
cases are cited in Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(B): Seventy-Five And Ready For
Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711, 714–51 n. 275 (2013).
136 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 21.
137 Id.
138
This is because one virtually always denies and the other virtually always grants
jurisdiction.
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before the traditional notion of a final judgment.139 This is because
appellate courts will grant jurisdiction in some but not all cases, and be
required to comb the district court record for evidence of intent to
manipulate appellate jurisdiction.140 Exactly what evidence? To date,
there has never been a comprehensive and exhaustive list of criteria laid
out, but throughout the case law appellate judges have identified several
factors in their opinions which have been considered before accepting or
denying appellate jurisdiction. The factors include but are not limited to
whether: (1) the non-adjudicated claims are dismissals with or without
courtapproval;141 (2) the non-adjudicated claims are subject to the statute
of limitations clock or whether there is an agreement to permit revival of
the dismissed claims regardless of statute of limitations concerns;142 (3)
the losing or prevailing party has dismissed the non-adjudicated claims;143
(4) parties have engaged in dilatory tactics, such as prodding the district
court to dismiss non-adjudicated claims without prejudice for failure to
prosecute;144 (5) the non-adjudicated claims have been re-filed and if
horizontal piecemeal litigation concerns are present;145 (6) nonadjudicated claims are dismissed in multiple steps or through
amendments;146 (7) non-adjudicated claims dismissed without prejudice
are closely related to the partial adjudication or the number of parties and
complexity of litigation would invite piecemeal appellate review.147
139 See generally Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 21 (“The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ practice of
combing the record for evidence of manipulative intent and the Third Circuit’s
analysis . . . waste resources better spent on the merits of appeals. Jurisdiction is a threshold
matter.”).
140 Id.; see also supra note 51.
141 See supra notes 72–73.
142 See supra notes 72–73; see also infra note 185.
143 See Section II(B)(6)(b) infra notes 163–186 (describing case law where courts
considered or made a note about whether a prevailing or losing party dismissed claims
without prejudice and sought to appeal).
144 See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984); Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d
1234 (9th Cir. 1979).
145 See Section II(B)(3)(a) supra notes 106-115 (describing situations where parties
manufacture finality, refile claims dismissed without prejudice in a different district court,
and simultaneously appeal any adverse rulings).
146 See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2003).
147 See id. The Supreme Court has also held closely related claims with overlapping
factual allegations in complex litigation can still be successful candidates for Rule 54(b),
although the relatedness of the claims can still be a factor weighing against the exercise of
Rule 54(b) review. See Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering Foundry Co., 351
U.S. 445, 451 n.6 (1956) (“Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1939, it may well have been true that the Court of Appeals would not, at this
stage, have had jurisdiction over United’s appeal. Under the single judicial unit theory of
finality which was then recognized, the Court of Appeals would have been without
jurisdiction until United’s counterclaim also had been decided by the District Court. That
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In the majority of cases, answering these questions will not be any
more difficult and likely much easier than completing the two-part
“separateness” and “no just reason for delay” analysis required for Rule
54(b) appeals.148 This means that in comparison to the Ryan rule, the
discretionary approach comes with significant benefits in terms of clarity,
deference to the district courts, and fairness to the parties, despite minimal
procedural review costs.149
6. The Parties
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham has remarked:
[T]he proper allocation of federal jurisdiction is of profound
importance to federal judges, but it is of even more importance to
the future welfare of American citizens. How we deal with [the]
issues of . . . jurisdiction of federal courts has more to do with our
values, our appraisal, and our vision of America than it does with
any subtle issue[s] of . . . jurisdiction . . . . [I]f judicial reform
benefits only judges, then it isn’t worth pursuing. If it holds out
progress only for the legal profession, then it isn’t worth
pursuing . . . . It is worth pursuing only if it helps to secure those
constitutional and statutory rights which, because they should be
enjoyed by all of our citizens, have made our democracy, despite
its faults and failures, a significant model for the world.150

a. Parties and the Ryan Rule
As discussed above, the Ryan rule comes with certain piecemeal
litigation, district court, and appellate court resource benefits.151
Nonetheless, these advantages may come at an extreme cost to parties in
litigation. This is because the Ryan rule requires a choice between two
extremes: incurring significant and potentially unnecessary costs to litigate
peripheral claims to final adjudication in order to keep them, or dismissing
them with prejudice and losing them forever to obtain early appellate

would have been so even if the counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction and
occurrence as Cold Metal’s claim.”).
148 See supra note 87.
149 See supra note 87.
150 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction: The Essential Guarantor of
Human Rights, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 57,
61(C. Harrison & R. Wheeler, eds., 1989).
151 See Sections II(B)(3-5)(describing the Ryan rule’s piecemeal litigation advantages,
disctrict court authority advantages, and appellate court preservation of resource
advantages); see also supra notes 92–120, 132–34.
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review.152 If parties are unaware of the rule against manufactured finality
in Ryan jurisdictions, there is the potential for overly harsh outcomes and
unknowingly falling into a “finality trap.”153 In other cases, where a party
is familiar with the Ryan rule, but their opponent is not, there is the
potential for “pushing” an opponent into a “finality trap” after prevailing
in a partial adjudication.154
b. Litigation Limbo & the Finality Trap
Imagine a party has brought a three count action in a circuit following
the Ryan rule. The district court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the first, most significant and major claim, but leaves the two other more
minor and peripheral claims untouched. After conducting a cost-benefit
analysis, the plaintiff determines the minor and peripheral claims aren’t
worth pursuing independently, but are still valuable for their “bolstering”
and supplementary effect on the major claim. In light of this relatively
reasonable analysis, the plaintiff dismisses its remaining claims without
prejudice and appeals.
This seemingly innocent mistake can have harsh and drastic
consequences. After dismissing the non-adjudicated claims without
prejudice, and as a matter of right, the action is no longer on the district or
appellate court dockets.155 The case is no longer on the district court’s
docket, because all the claims have been adjudicated or dismissed.156
Similarly, the case will never reach an appellate court’s docket since in
152

See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 15(11th Cir. 1999)
(encouraging parties to make tough choices about dismissing claims with prejudice or
litigating them to finality). Id. at 20 (Cox, J., concurring) (discussing the need to litigate
claims to finality or lose them forever in Ryan jurisdictions).
153 See infra note 155.
154 See infra notes 177–87 (discussing the concept of a prevailing party that has the only
remaining claims left in a suit dismissing their remaining claims without prejudice in order
to block their opponents from appealing).
155
See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 19 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“Once the district court has relinquished jurisdiction, the litigant has no sure way of
obtaining finality that would permit review of the district court’s order in this action. If
the litigant begins a new action with the voluntarily dismissed claims, and that second
action proceeds to judgment, the litigant of course cannot raise issues from the first action
on appeal in the second action. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moreover, do not
provide any explicit mechanism for “undismissing,” after judgment, any voluntarily
dismissed claims so that the litigant could ultimately appeal.”); see also Marshall v. Kan.
City Southern Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 499-500 (5th Cir. 2004) (where plaintiff dismissed
remaining claims without prejudice and the appellate court denied jurisdiction); Pickens
and Gattis, supra note 121 (acknowledging that after dismissals without prejudice and a
denial of appellate jurisdiction the finality trap is sprung and the case is no longer pending
in any court).
156 See supra note 155.
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Ryan jurisdictions there is no appealable final judgment.157 The partial
judgment is stuck in a finality trap – litigation limbo.158
This problem is not uncommon since the issue of manufactured
finality and the rules governing the issue are not widely known by
practitioners.159 Nonetheless, some appellate courts have given parties an
“out” and the option to dismiss remaining claims with prejudice at oral
argument in order to create appellate jurisdiction.160
c. Prevailing Parties and the Finality Trap
In the hypothetical above, only the losing party dismissed nonadjudicated claims without prejudice. Nonetheless, Ryan rule jurisdictions
have held true to the idea that all remaining claims must be dismissed with
prejudice or litigated to finality in order to produce a final appealable
judgment.161 This is true even if the prevailing party is the party left with
non-adjudicated claims, and the “losing party” has no control over whether
the prevailing party chooses to dismiss its non-adjudicated claims with or
without prejudice.162
For example, in State Treasurer of Michigan v. Barry all of the
plaintiffs’ claims were adjudicated or dismissed with prejudice.163 The
only non-adjudicated claims in the case were from the defendant’s
counterclaim.164 By agreement, the parties stipulated that the defendant
could dismiss its non-adjudicated counterclaims without prejudice in order
to facilitate appellate review of the adjudicated claims and avoid
157

See supra note 155.
See supra note 155.
159 See generally Pickens and Gattis supra note 121.
160 See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary Dist., 629 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir.
2010) (“So at argument we gave Arrow’s lawyer the following choice: stand your ground
and we’ll dismiss the appeal, or convert your dismissal of the other two defendants to
dismissal with prejudice, which will bar your refiling your claims against them. He quickly
chose the second option, committing not to refile the suit against them, and so, because the
final judgment in the district court is now definitive, we have jurisdiction of the appeal.”)
(citing India Breweries, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 612 F.3d 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2010));
Helcher v. Dearborn County, 595 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 2010); JTC Petroleum Co. v.
Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 776-77 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Nat’l Inspection &
Repairs v. George S. May, 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (allowing dismissals with
prejudice of remaining claims after oral argument resulting in the panel finding
jurisdiction).
161 See State Treasurer of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999).
162 See e.g. Hood v. Plantation Gen. Med. Ctr, 251 F.3d 932 (11th Cir. 2001)
(dismissing an appeal by one plantiff because another plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed
the claim) (cited in Pickens and Gattis, supra note 121 at n.11.) See generally infra notes
163–86.
163
168 F.3d 8.
164 Id. at 9–11.
158
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potentially unnecessary litigation of the counterclaim.165 Despite the
approval of both parties, the appellate court found the losing party’s
agreement to the dismissal weighed against, not in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction.166 A major reason for the ultimate denial of appellate
jurisdiction was the fear that the parties could undermine the district court
by manufacturing finality without the court’s approval.167
Nonetheless, what if the district court approves dismissal of the nonadjudicated claims to alleviate this concern?168 This is precisely what
occurred in Heimann v. Snead, but still, it was not enough.169 In that case,
the Heimanns’ filed a seven count diversity action against bank defendants
alleging multiple theories of mortgage foreclosure improprieties.170
The defendants
Defendants counterclaimed alleging trespass.171
successfully disposed of six of the seven counts in the plaintiff’s
complaint.172 Soon after, the parties agreed the plaintiffs would dismiss
their remaining claim with prejudice, while the defendant would dismiss
its counterclaim without prejudice.173 The parties submitted this
agreement to the district court and obtained its approval for the
dismissals.174 The district court expressed its approval and stated that, “the
matter is now final and immediately appealable.”175 Still, adhering to the
Ryan rule, appellate jurisdiction was denied, and the circuit court justified
its ruling based on a concern that manufactured finality undermined Rule
54(b).176

165

Id.
Id. at 13 (“[P]laintiff, argues, it had no control of the manner in which the dismissal
of the [Defendants’] counterclaim took place, either with or without prejudice. This
argument fails, however, because Plaintiff consented to the dismissal without prejudice of
Defendants’ counterclaims.”)
167 Id. (“[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that parties to a suit cannot agree to grant this
Court appellate jurisdiction.”).
168 See Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1998).
169 Id.
170 See id.at 768.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Heimann, 133 F.3d at 768.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 769 (“The plain language of Rule 54(b) . . . [controls where] the court disposed
of “fewer than all claims” on the merits. Thus Rule 54(b), not § 1291, provides Plaintiffs’
with the means for appeal in [that] case.”).
166

2014]

Increase Access to the Appellate Courts

77

d. Parties and the Discretionary and Per Se Rules
On the other hand, circuits permitting manufactured finality avoid
the harsh consequences that the district courts and cooperative parties
faced in State Treasurer and Heimann.177
Permitting manufactured finality also prevents prevailing parties
from being able to strategically dismiss minor non-adjudicated claims in
order to trap opponents in litigation limbo.178 Unlike State Treasurer and
Heimann, sometimes a prevailing party will dismiss its non-adjudicated
claims without prejudice with the intention of stopping an opponent from
obtaining appellate review.179 Logically, since the goal of a prevailing
party’s manipulation is to block appellate review, Ryan jurisdictions only
contribute to this manipulation, because the remedy to this dilatory tactic
is to grant, not deny the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.180
For example, in Local Motion v. Niescher, the plaintiff, Local
Motion, filed suit against a former distributor and licensee based on causes
of action for breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.181 Local Motion prevailed on
a motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith claims.182 Shortly after, Local Motion
dismissed the only remaining non-adjudicated claims without prejudice
and the defendant then appealed.183
177

This is because appellate courts can grant jurisdiction and rule upon certain
judgments manufactured for finality. See generally State Treasurer of State of Michigan
v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 20 (Cox, J., concurring).
178 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 20 (Cox, J., concurring).
179 See Pickens and Gattis, supra note 121 at n. 12. (“In fact, the finality trap may create
an opportunity for an egregious type of manipulation of the judicial process: If a party
determines during the course of litigation that it will likely prevail, it might add a claim (or
counterclaim) solely to dismiss it without prejudice later, and thereby arguably prevent its
adversary from ever being able to appeal the adverse ruling – in effect, ensuring that its
anticipated victory is unappealable.”). See generally infra note 175–82.
180
See Local Motion v. Niescher, 105 F.3d 1278, 1279 (9th Cir. 1997). The court
found:
Local Motion contends the dismissal of its remaining claims without
prejudice means there is no final judgment. This court has held that a losing
party may not “manufacture finality” by dismissing his or her remaining
claims without prejudice. Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d
1073 (9th Cir.1994). Here, however, the prevailing party has dismissed the
remaining claims without prejudice in an effort to prevent an appeal.
Dannenberg and similar cases disapproved a party’s “manipulation” of the
appellate process. Local Motion is not entitled to use similar manipulation to
thwart an appeal. The district court’s judgment is appealable. Id.
181 Id.
182
Id.
183 Id.
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At the appellate court, Local Motion argued against appellate
jurisdiction asserting that, “the dismissal of its remaining claims without
prejudice means there is no final judgment.”184 The Ninth Circuit found
that a prevailing party’s unilateral dismissal of non-adjudicated claims
without prejudice, even with court approval, was a manipulative attempt
to block appellate jurisdiction.185 The court found that although in the
typical case, a losing party’s manipulation is an attempt to create
jurisdiction, in cases involving a prevailing party’s manipulation, the
appropriate remedy is to exercise jurisdiction.186
Without manufactured finality, on the other hand, the prevailing
party’s manipulation would successfully block jurisdiction, leaving the
losing party stuck with an adverse decision and without the ability to
obtain appellate review– stuck in a finality trap and in litigation limbo.187
7. Conditional Finality
Throughout the case law and academic literature, “conditional
dismissals,” or dismissals with conditional prejudice, are dismissals of
non-adjudicated claims where the ultimate “with” or “without prejudice”
designation depends upon the outcome of an appeal.188 Here both terms
are used interchangeably.
The Ryan, Per Se, and Discretionary Standard Rule Jurisdictions,
the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court: Dismissals With
Conditional Prejudice
a. The Majority
To date, apart from the Second Circuit, every circuit faced with
scenarios involving conditional dismissals have rejected the practice.189
184

Id.
Local Motion, 105 F.3d at 1279.
186 Id.
187 See generally Section II(B)(6)(b), supra notes 155–79 (describing situations where
prevailing parties dismissed remaining claims without prejudice and the losing party was
denied the right to appeal regardless of whether the district court approved).
188 See generally Joseph Struble, An Early Roll of the Dice: Appeal Under Conditional
Finality in Federal Court, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 221 (2012).
189 See Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC, 733 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2013)
(rejecting conditional dismissals for undermining the concept of finality, Rule 54(b) and
Section 1292, contributing to successive appeals, and avoiding statute of limitations risks);
SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 55–56 (2nd Cir. 2011) (allowing conditional dismissal); India
Breweries, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 612 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting conditional
dismissals but exercising jurisdiction after dismissal of remaining claims with prejudice at
oral argument); National Inspection & Repairs v. George S. May, 600 F.3d 878 (7th Cir.
185
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Even circuits currently applying a Per Se or Discretionary Standard rule
have rejected conditional finality.190 This is because historically,
jurisdictions permitting manufactured finality justified the practice based
on the fact that non-adjudicated claims dismissed without prejudice were
subject to the statute of limitations and couldn’t be re-filed indefinitely.191
Since dismissals with conditional prejudice often times interrupt or stop
the statute of limitations clock, conditional dismissals have been
categorically considered manipulative and denied appellate review.192
b. The Second Circuit
Surprisingly, the Second Circuit traditionally a Ryan jurisdiction,
approved of conditional dismissals in Purdy v. Zeldes.193 In that case, the
plaintiff, Purdy filed a legal malpractice action against his former criminal
defense lawyers alleging they were negligent in: (1) failing to learn that 29
other first-time offenders were charged with the same offense, pled guilty,
and avoided prison sentences; (2) failing to inform Purdy of statements
made by the prosecutor; and (3) failing to inform him that cooperation and
a reduced sentence were still possible at post-sentencing.194
The attorneys argued that the first two negligence allegations were
barred by collateral estoppel based on earlier rulings in an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim brought against them during Purdy’s

2010) (same); Clos v. Corr. Corp. of Am, 597 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (where the district
court approved Rule 54(b) certification and denied conditional dismissals, the appellate
court disapproved of both Rule 54(b) and conditional finality leading the appeal to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253 (2nd Cir. 2003) (allowing
conditional dismissal); Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d
431 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting conditional finality, but ultimately exercising jurisdiction
after remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice) (citing Verzilli v. Flexon, Inc., 295
F.3d 421 (3d. Cir. 2002) (rejecting conditional finality)); First Health Group v. BCE
Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2001) (decision cited by many more recent Seventh
Circuit opinions and other circuits rejecting conditional finality, but one which questions
and does not ultimately decide whether conditional dismissals properly can be held to
create a final judgment); Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.
1994) (rejecting conditional finality for creating risk of successive appeals, undermining
Rule 54(b), and not ending the litigation on the merits) (citing Cheng v. Comm’r, 878 F.2d
306 (9th Cir. 1989) (but in Cheng there was no provision stating that the dismissals would
be with prejudice if the appellate court affirmed the district court unlike more modern
conditional dismissals)).
190 See supra note 189.
191 See State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999). See
generally supra note 189.
192 See generally supra note 189.
193
337 F.3d 253 (2nd Cir. 2003).
194 Id. at 257.
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incarceration.195 The district court agreed collateral estoppel barred the
first two allegations, but denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to the third allegation that Purdy’s defense attorneys failed to
inform him of vital post-sentencing information.196
Nonetheless Purdy felt the post-sentence allegation was not worth
pursuing independently, and moved to dismiss the third claim with
conditional prejudice, that is, Purdy agreed to a “with prejudice” dismissal
of his the third claim, but only if, the adverse adjudications of his first two
allegations were upheld on appeal.197 The district court approved of the
conditional dismissals.198 The Second Circuit similarly approved stating:
A plaintiff’s attempt to appeal a prior adverse determination
following the dismissal of his remaining claims without prejudice
necessarily implicates the policies of the final judgment rule . . .
[W]hen a plaintiff is completely free to relitigate voluntarily
dismissed claims, the final judgment rule ordinarily precludes this
court from reviewing any adverse determination by the district
court in that case. However, where, as here, a plaintiff’s ability to
reassert a claim is made conditional on obtaining a reversal from
this court, the finality rule is not implicated in the same way.
Unlike the plaintiff in Chappelle, Purdy runs the risk that if his
appeal is unsuccessful; his malpractice case comes to an end. We
therefore hold that a conditional waiver such as Purdy’s creates a
final judgment reviewable by this court.199

Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, the
appeal was unsuccessful, and as a result, Purdy’s case ended.200
Despite the rejection of conditional finality by the majority of
circuits, there is still historical precedent for dismissing claims with
attached conditions. For example, even before the Ryan rule was created,
in LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that a
district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s action without prejudice but with
certain heightened conditions and limitations on the ability to reopen the
case carried with it the requisite “legal prejudice” to be considered a final
judgment. 201 Specifically, in LeCompte, the Fifth Circuit recognized that
a dismissal without prejudice but with the court imposed conditions that:
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Purdy, 337 F.3d at 258.
Id. at 260.
528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976).
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(1) any later suits be re-filed in the same court; (2) a showing of
extraordinary circumstances be made, and (3) an affirmative
demonstration of a valid cause of action be presented before the suit could
be revived was an appealable final judgment. 202 The Seventh Circuit has
more recently recognized a dismissal with certain conditions may lead to
the “legal prejudice” necessary for an appeal, leaving open the possibility
that other circuits may later adopt a similar view.203
c. The Supreme Court, Conditional Dismissals, and Manufactured
Finality: SEC v. Gabelli
More recently, the Supreme Court decided a case involving claims
dismissed with conditional prejudice, although the opinion centered on a
securities law tolling issue, and declined to the address the issue of
manufactured finality.204 In Gabelli, the SEC brought a three count
202

See id. at 602.
Palka v. Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 438 n.4 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[i]f the district court
imposes conditions on the voluntary dismissal, and if those conditions amount to ‘legal
prejudice,’ the plaintiff then may have grounds for appeal.”) (citing Parker v. Freightliner
Corp., 940 F.2d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1991)).
204 Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013). The Court’s unanimous decision rejects the
discovery rule in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run on SEC claims
based on the Investment Advisers Act for civil penalties. See Jonathan Macey, Opinion
analysis: That Which Does Not Kill the SEC May Make the Agency Stronger, SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb. 28, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/opinion-analysis-thatwhich-does-not-kill-the-sec-may-make-the-agency-stronger/ (pointing out the decision on
balance favors the SEC because if the statute of limitations ran according to when the SEC
could have reasonably discovered fraud that it might be compelled to refute arguments in
virtually every case that, had it been reasonably diligent, the SEC would have known of
the fraud much earlier and therefore is time barred from bringing the case); Rachel
McKenzie &Robert Cohen, Supreme Court Unanimously Limits SEC’s Ability to Bring
Civil Penalty Claims to Conduct Older than Five Years, ORRICK – SECURITIES LITIGATION
AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Feb. 27, 2013), http://blogs.orrick.com/securitieslitigation/2013/02/27/supreme-court-unanimously-limits-secs-ability-to-bring-civilpenalty-claims-for-conduct-older-than-five-years/#more-326 (evaluating the application
of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 and explaining the Supreme Court’s decision as being significant for
three reasons: (1) Section 2462 applies to district court and agency enforcement
proceedings; (2) its potential application to equitable tolling arguments involving Section
2462; (3) its potential application to injunctive relief and the Supreme Court’s SEC v.
Bartek, et. al. decision.); Christopher M. Mason, et al., Gabelli v. SEC, NIXON PEABODY:
SECURITIES LITIGATION ALERT (March 1, 2013), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/
Gabelli_v_SEC/ (claiming the Gabelli decision represents a victory for the defense bar, but
cautioning that even if penalties are subject to a five year limitations period that other
equitable relief may still be available to the SEC); Stephen A. Fogdall, Gabelli v. SEC: The
Supreme Court’s Statute of Limitations Rulings Puts Pressure on Federal Agencies to
Investigate More Aggressively and Sue More Quickly, SCHNADER – FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION ALERT (March 2013), http://www.schnader.com/files/ Uploads/Documents/
FSLPG%20Alert_Gabelli%20v%20SEC_03-2013.pdf (highlighting the distinction
between the SEC and privately aggrieved parties, and emphasizing that the decision may
203
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complaint against a mutual fund’s portfolio manager and the CEO of the
fund’s adviser.205 The SEC sought civil monetary damages, disgorgement,
and injunctive relief based on violations of the 1933 Securities Act (“‘33
Act”), the 1934 Securities & Exchange Act (“34 Act”), and the Investment
Advisors Act (“IAA” or “Advisors Act”).206
The district court dismissed the first two counts of the complaint
seeking injunctive relief, and also dismissed a portion of the third count
seeking civil penalties under the Investment Advisers Act.207 Only the
SEC’s claim for disgorgement based on the Advisors Act in the third count
remained.208
The SEC ultimately felt disgorgement alone was an inadequate
remedy and moved to voluntarily dismiss that claim with conditional
prejudice 209 In other words, the SEC agreed it could only re-file the
disgorgement claim “if but only if, the SEC [was] successful” on appeal.210
The district court granted the SEC’s motion to conditionally dismiss the
disgorgement claim over the defendant’s objections.211 The Second
Circuit affirmed the validity of the conditional dismissal, finding there was
a final judgment, since, unlike a traditional dismissal without prejudice
and nothing more, a party replaces the risk posed by the expiration of the
statute of limitations with the risk that claims will be lost forever if their
appeal is unsuccessful.212 Upon exercising appellate jurisdiction, the
Second Circuit reversed all of the district court’s dismissals, and reinstated
the ‘33,’34 and Advisors Act causes of action, including all claims for
injunctive relief and civil penalties.213
Gabelli appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the limited question of whether the statute of limitations barred the SEC
from recovering civil penalties through the Advisors Act.214 Ultimately,
on this issue, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Second Circuit
put more pressure on the SEC to use its investigative parties more frequently and earlier in
order to assume a litigation posture more promptly and minimize the risk of a limitations
bar); Walter Olson, Gabelli v. SEC: Fairness Wins, 9–0, CATO AT LIBERTY (February 28,
2013), http://www.cato.org/blog/gabelli-v-sec-fairness-wins-9-0 (championing the Gabelli
decision as a limitation upon the SEC’s discretionary powers).
205 SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2011).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 56.
210 Gabelli, 553 F.3d at 57.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213
Id. at 61.
214 Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013).
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and found the “discovery rule” did not apply to SEC actions based on the
Advisors Act, that the statute of limitations had expired, and the SEC could
no longer recover civil penalties.215
The Court’s decision to grant certiorari but failure to specifically
address the issues of conditional dismissals and manufactured finality may
be for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, it could be that the Court
simply overlooked the issue or found it lacked enough importance for its
resolution in that term. On the other hand, the Court may have felt it was
an inopportune time to address them for any number of reasons (docket
management, lack of urgency, a desire to allow the doctrine to develop
among the circuits before intervening, implicit approval of manufactured
finality, or other reasons). Regardless, one thing is certain, the Court,
unlike many of the circuits, has not yet decided that appellate jurisdiction
is categorically improper in the presence of a conditional dismissal or a
judgment manufactured for finality.
III. LIMITED ACCEPTANCE OF MANUFACTURED FINALITY
In this section, Part A argues that a gradual shift towards limited
acceptance of manufactured is largely inevitable and already underway.
Part B argues limited acceptance of manufactured finality and the
Discretionary Standard is the most advantageous approach because of its
net fairness, efficiency, and piecemeal litigation benefits, despite appellate
resource and uniformity cost disadvantages. Part C argues that despite the
disadvantages discussed, the Supreme Court should act to harmonize the
transition towards limited acceptance of manufactured finality by: (1)
adopting a discretionary approach and providing enumerated criteria for
appellate courts to consider when deciding whether to exercise appellate
jurisdiction and (2) explicitly permitting the dismissal of remaining claims
with conditional prejudice in order to minimize the expenditure of
appellate resources and maximize uniformity in the transition to
acceptance of limited manufactured finality.
A. A Shift Towards Limited Acceptance of Manufactured Finality
Up until this point, the article has treated the three approaches to
manufactured finality as entirely distinct and separate. Nonetheless in
practice, through the creation of exceptions and intra-circuit divides, some

215

Id.
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of the circuits are converging towards limited acceptance of manufactured
finality, albeit at different paces and in different manners.216
On the one hand, the Eighth Circuit, usually a follower of the Per Se
rule, recently applied a discretionary approach by finding appellate
jurisdiction existed after determining there was an absence of
manipulation.217
On the other hand, some of the Ryan circuits have created exceptions
to strict finality and moved closer to a de facto Discretionary Standard.218
For example, in the Fifth Circuit, a district court’s dismissal of claims
without prejudice for improper joinder did not prevent the plaintiff from
seeking appellate review.219 Similarly, in the Eleventh Circuit, a party’s
dismissal of claims without prejudice did not prevent appellate jurisdiction
where an appellate panel ruled the district court improperly denied the
joinder of an indispensable party.220
The transition is also found in the Second Circuit’s acceptance of
conditional finality.221 For example, absent alternative appellate doctrines,
Ryan jurisdictions refuse to consider a judgment final, unless remaining
claims have been dismissed with prejudice or the claims have been fully
adjudicated on the merits .222 Nonetheless, as acknowledged in LeCompte
v. Mr. Chip, Inc., Ryan jurisdictions may eventually expand their views to
embrace conditional finality, since “legal prejudice” does not necessarily
require non-adjudicated claims to be dismissed with prejudice.223
At the same time, circuits that have historically applied a pragmatic
view towards finality have carefully placed boundaries and limitations on
their doctrines. For example, the Sixth Circuit and Eighth Circuit,
traditionally Per Se jurisdictions, have recently found that conditional

216 See generally notes 44, 48, and 51 and accompanying text. These notes cite to Ryan,
Per Se, and Discretionary Standard rule cases throughout the circuits. Although many
appellate panels expressly endorse a single rule, some circuits have different lines of cases
for different rules, while others adopt characteristics or rulings from competing rules in
practice.
217 Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2012) (“In short, the
circumstances here are inconsistent with a conclusion that Gannon sought to manipulate
our appellate jurisdiction. So, we turn to the merits of the appeal.”).
218 See Brown Shoes Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962); Gannon Int’l, Ltd.,
684 F.3d 785; Equity Inv. Partners, Lp. v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2010).
219 See Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2010).
220 See Equity Inv. Partners, Lp v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2010).
221 See generally Section II(B)(7)(b), supra notes 193–215 (describing the Second
Circuit’s adoption of conditional finality despite being a traditional Ryan rule jurisdiction).
222 See generally note 44.
223
See Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 438 n.4 (7th Cir. 2011); LeCompte v.
Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976).
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dismissals were categorically inappropriate and denied the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction. 224
B. In Advocacy of Acceptance of Limited Manufactured Finality and the
Discretionary Standard
Consideration of the seven criteria support the idea that the shift
towards limited acceptance of manufactured finality is more than just a
coincidence. Specifically, as Ryan jurisdictions face finality trap issues,
and Per Se jurisdictions face piecemeal litigation concerns, exceptions and
the need for movement towards a more moderate approach will become
apparent. Admittedly, the limited acceptance of manufactured finality and
the Discretionary Standard isn’t without its own associated costs.225
Nonetheless, between the three approaches it is the most advantageous
approach in terms of its fairness, efficiency, and piecemeal litigation
benefits versus its uniformity and appellate resource costs.226
Below is a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of an
adoption of the discretionary approach in light of the background section,
fairness, efficiency, piecemeal litigation, uniformity, and appellate
resources considerations.
1. Advantages
a. Fairness & Efficiency
Limited acceptance of manufactured finality balances the heightened
fact pleading standard requirements marked by Iqbal and Twombly.227 As
plaintiffs are required to plead more fully developed factual accounts of
their causes of action, the ability of parties to appeal partial judgments to
obtain clarity on the application of legal authority makes sense in a world
where pre-trial rulings can determine the terms of settlement.228 In terms
224

See supra note 189.
See generally Barry, 168 F.3d 8 at 21 (“The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ practice of
combing the record for evidence of manipulative intent and the Third Circuit’s
analysis . . . waste resources better spent on the merits of appeals. Jurisdiction is a threshold
matter.”). But see supra note 87 (detailing that the added procedural review costs are not
as great as they seem when compared to the alternative Rule 54(b) analysis which some
have argued is unclear and is as burdensome if not more burdensome than the one applied
by Discretionary Standard jurisdictions to reveal manipulative intent).
226 This is generally because a Discretionary Standard simultaneously avoids the Ryan
rule’s potential unfairness to parties from the finality trap, and the Per Se rule’s potential
for creating significant piecemeal litigation. See generally Section II(B)(3-6), supra.
227 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) (adopting a heightened plausibility pleading standard).
228 See Bergeron and Khula supra note 5.
225
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of resources costs, the Discretionary Standard is also advantageous, since,
unlike the past, the resource burden of appeals are significantly less
burdensome than from large-scale discovery and trial proceedings.229
As noted in the introduction and background sections, the majority
of high-stakes and complex cases are settled after pre-trial motions and
discovery refine bargaining positions.230 Because parties are less likely to
proceed to trial in modern litigation, preventing parties from being able to
manufacture finality, even in cases where the parties intentions are
innocuous, creates situations where party’s are forced to sacrifice viable
and important supplementary claims, critical for bargaining leverage and
resolving litigation without any appellate oversight or involvement. 231 In
other words, without manufactured finality, trial courts are unintentionally
left with the unexpected responsibility of having the last word on both fact
and legal issues, rather than on fact issues alone.232
For this reason, the option to manufacture finality complements
rather than undermines Rule 54(b).233 Rule 54(b) still presents the only
option for parties to obtain early appellate review, while remaining claims
continue to be litigated at the district court.234 There is reason to believe
district courts will embrace the increased flexibility of manufactured
finality as a complement to Rule 54(b).235 As noted above, in Ryan v.
Occidental Petroleum, the trial court in that case granted Rule 54(b),
reversed its ruling, and then permitted the parties to manufacture
finality.236 Furthermore, the additional appellate oversight provided by a
discretionary standard, especially in areas of law where vanishing trials
229 See Carrington supra note 15. Professor Carrington is troubled by the lack of access
to appellate review in several respects. First appellate rulings are key to uniformity,
fairness, and equality. In addition, appellate insight into complex legal issues facilitates
settlement, and also potentially “fairer” settlements, because the parties are afforded a more
detailed and nuanced understanding of their bargaining positions as the legal issues in their
disputes will become clearer and more refined. Perhaps most importantly, access to the
appellate courts before a traditional final judgment saves precious judicial resources.
Unlike the times which spurned a strict interpretation of the final judgment rule, today,
Justices no longer have to travel great lengths in order to hear an appeal.
230 See supra notes 3–12.
231 See supra notes 82–83.
232 See supra note 13.
233 Cf. State Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“Our precedent guides our conclusion that exercising jurisdiction here ‘would undermine
the policies of judicial efficency, avoiding piecemeal litigation, and district court
independence that are the basis of the final judgment rule.’”).
234 See id. at 15.
235 See id. at 13 (“Our precedent guides our conclusion that exercising jurisdiction here
‘would undermine the policies of judicial efficency, avoiding piecemeal litigation, and
district court independence that are the basis of the final judgment rule.’”).
236 See generally Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum, 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.).
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and settlement are especially common, will likely be a much welcomed
addition by district court judges and parties, since district courts may not
necessarily wish to exercise the responsibility of administering justice in
solitude.237
Unlike Ryan, the discretionary standard avoids the grave injustice of
the finality trap.238 For many trial attorneys, the issue of manufactured
finality is an unfamiliar one. As a result, it is not uncommon for parties to
manufacture finality unwittingly, and then be denied appellate
jurisdiction.239 Although some appellate panels have permitted parties to
dismiss their remaining claims with prejudice at oral argument, this ad hoc
solution is not a sustainable, workable, and long-term comprehensive
solution, in light of its inability to prevent prevailing parties from blocking
appellate jurisdiction.240

237

See Paul D. Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts:
Relationships in the Future, in C. Harrison & R. Wheeler, eds., THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 71-79 (Federal Judicial Center 1989). Professor
Carrington notes that the federal judiciary is at the heights of its influence, and that
simultaneously that influence is entrusted to district court judges who are “at the cockpit”
of the federal judiciary not only relative to the citizenry, but also relative to support from
magistrates, special masters, and arbitrators.
In light of these circumstances, Professor Carrington argues district courts welcome
and recognize the need for appellate court added involvement:
[I]t is my impression that [district court judges] need and even want the
appellate courts to share more in their many moments of travail. None, I am
sure, wish to be reversed more frequently. But only an uncaring or
unknowing judge would wish to perform so awesome a duty without others
near at hand to give approval, advice, occasional correction, and moral
support. Appellate judges are their “support group.” Under the best of
circumstances, their job is very difficult. It must be very trying to exercise so
much responsibility in so great a solitude. Not only are our district judges
increasingly undercompensated by their penurious employer, but they must
suffer increasing neglect from those who are their support. It is a wonder that
their professionalism remains as high as it does.
Id. at 78. Professor Carrington also believes that Roscoe Pound would advance a theory
of appellate court involvement in deciding legal issues, even before trial, and that this
involvement would facilitate more and better settlements. Id. at 80-82.
238 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 20 (Cox, J., concurring) (noting the Ryan jurisdictions
rejection of manufactured finality leads parties into a finality trap where claims are no
longer on trial or appellate court dockets); see also Local Motion v. Niescher, 105 F.3d
1278 (9th Cir. 1997) (in contrast to Ryan jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit exercised
jurisdiction where a prevailing party attempted to manipulate the appellate panel into
blocking appellate review of the losing party’s adverse judgment).
239
See Pickens and Gattis, supra note 121.
240 See supra note 160.
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b. Piecemeal Litigation
As the most fundamental and historic concern underlying the final
judgment rule, any proposed solution to manufactured finality must
address piecemeal litigation concerns.241 Admittedly, re-filing and
successive appeals scenarios are rare, but nonetheless enormously costly
and detrimental to the administration of justice by the federal and state
judiciaries.
In light of Coeur D’Alene, the Per Se rule’s re-filing risks and
potential for creating horizontal and vertical piecemeal litigation is too
great.242 Permitting the possibility of dismissed claims to be re-filed or for
successive appeals to be made without limit fails to acknowledge
fundamental concerns underlying the final judgment rule.243
On the other hand, “regulated” access to the appellate courts through
a discretionary standard and denial of jurisdiction to parties that have refiled their dismiss claims or are likely to file successive appeals is a longterm, comprehensive, and workable solution. Similarly, parties that
conditionally dismiss their claims avoid horizontal and piecemeal
litigation concerns since a party’s claims are only revived if successful on
appeal.
2. Disadvantages
The discretionary standard approach carries with it uniformity and
procedural review costs which its alternatives do not. These are briefly
discussed below.244 Part C of this section also addresses means to
minimize these disadvantages.
a. Uniformity & Appellate Resources
In comparison to the Ryan and Per Se rules, the Discretionary
Standard carries with it uniformity and appellate review resource costs that
the others approaches do not.245 The primary concern will be whether

241

See supra notes 82–83.
See State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir.
1999); Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979).
243 See supra notes 82–83.
244 See American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp, 318 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2003); State
Treasurer of State of Michigan v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 21 (11th Cir. 1999) (Cox, J.,
concurring).
245 See Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 21 (Cox, J., concurring) (Arguing in favor of a Per Se rule,
Judge Cox believes the “practice of combing the record for evidence of manipulative
intent . . . waste[s] resources better spent on the merits of appeals. Jurisdiction is a
threshold matter. A bright-line rule is therefore preferable to determine whether
242
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scenarios involving similar material facts would be granted appellate
jurisdiction in some cases, but denied in others.246 Similarly, if appellate
dockets are overloaded, it is possible some of the circuits may believe their
resources would be better spent on substantive issues rather than on the
issues surrounding manufactured finality.247
Nonetheless, although these concerns are valid, the Supreme Court
can and should act to minimize the uniformity and appellate resource costs
by enumerating or codifying as many factors as it can to guide the federal
appellate courts when deciding whether to grant jurisdiction. In large part,
many of the factors have already been identified by the appellate courts
and the only thing lacking is Supreme Court attention, interest, guidance
and action on the issue.248
C. The Supreme Court Should Harmonize the Move Toward Limited
Acceptance of Manufactured Finality by Adopting the Framework of a
Discretionary Standard Permitting Conditional Finality
There are important and related consequences of indeterminacy in
our law. It affects the conduct of lawyers in both litigation and
settlement; and it reallocates power within the judiciary, making
appellate courts less effective and conferring increased discretion
on individual district judges.
With respect to lawyers, increasing indeterminacy of federal law
weakens the constraints of professionalism that operate on lawyers
as they draft and file pleadings, motions, and discovery requests to
be filed in federal courts. The willingness of lawyers to make
contentions resting on legal premises of doubtful merit is
increased. Lawyers are more likely to “press the inside of the
envelope” of legal entitlements to the bursting point, thus
imposing unjust costs on adversaries as well as courts and
themselves.249

jurisdiction exists or not . . . . [D]ismissals without prejudice should be considered a proper
component of a final decision . . . .” (citations omitted)).
246 E.g., American States Ins. Co., 318 F.3d 881 (where the majority ruled against the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a lengthy dissent by Justice Ferguson).
247 See Barry, 168 F.3d at 21 (Cox, J. conurring).
248 See Section II(B)(5), supra 141–47 (describing different factors appellate courts
have evaluated when deciding whether to reveiew a judgment manufactured for finality).
249 See Paul D. Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts:
Relationships in the Future, in C. Harrison & R. Wheeler, eds., THE FED. APP. JUDICIARY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Federal Judicial Center 1989).
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Uniformity is critical to provide the clarity the courts, lawyers, and
the citizenry need to understand their rights in federal court.250 In Gabelli,
the Supreme Court declined to provide guidance or issue an opinion on the
portion of the case involving manufactured finality.251 At best, the nonclarification could be construed as an implicit approval of the practice
since the Court is under an on-going obligation to address all jurisdictional
questions regardless of whether the parties raise them in their briefs.252 On
the other hand, there is case law where the Supreme Court has declined to
address a virtually identical jurisdictional issue in one case, later
acknowledged it another – only to ultimately find in the later case that
jurisdiction was likely inappropriate for both.253
Irrespective of Gabelli, the Court should endorse a discretionary
standard and permit parties to dismiss claims with conditional prejudice
through its rulemaking authority or stare decisis.254 Specifically, the Court
should identify factors weighing in favor and against the exercise of
jurisdiction with the recognition that none are entirely dispositive.
Factors weighing in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction would be
where:
(1) dismissals are with court approval;255
(2) dismissals are with party approval;256

250

Id.
Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013).
252 Cf. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 882–83 (1988) (noting implicit approval
of jurisdictional issue by granting jurisdiction and deciding the merits in Connecticut Dept.
of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985)) cited in Catherine T. Struve,
Memorandum to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules Re: Item No. 08-AP-H at n.17
(March 25, 2013) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Agenda%20Books/Appellate/AP2013-04-Vol-1.pdf.
253
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990) cited in Struve, supra
note 252 at n.18.
254 THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
§ 3.01 (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009) (“In 1990, in a noteworthy legislative development,
Congress amended the general rule-making statute to provide that the Supreme Court ‘may
define when a ruling of a district court is final for purposes of appeal’ under § 1291. No
such finality rules have yet been promulgated; therefore, appellate jurisdiction remains a
function of court opinions interpreting and applying the statute.”).
255 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (dismissal is with court approval); see also supra notes
72–73.
256 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (dismissal as a matter of right and without party
approval where the opposing party has not yet filed an answer or motion for summary
judgment); FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B) (dismissal is with opposing party’s approval). In
both these types of dismissals, the court is not required to approve of the dismissals.
251
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(3) there is a reasonable risk that dismissed claims will be lost
either due to the expiration of the statute of limitations or because
there is an agreement between the parties that the dismissed claims
may only be revived in the same district court if the appellate court
reverses in whole or in part; 257
(4) the prevailing party has dismissed their remaining claims and
it appears the dismissals are designed to prevent the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.258
Factors weighing against the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
would be where:
(1) parties have engaged in dilatory tactics, including but not
limited to prodding the district court to dismiss remaining claims
without prejudice for failure to prosecute;259
(2) dismissed claims have been re-filed and the presence of
horizontal piecemeal litigation concerns;260
(3) claims are dismissed in multiple steps or through
amendments261
(4) claims being dismissed closely relate to the claims being
appealed and the number of parties and complexity of litigation
would invite piecemeal appellate review.262

The enumerated criteria for courts to consider would be virtually
identical to those already present in the case law, with the modification
that dismissals with conditional prejudice would no longer categorically
weigh against the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. This type of rule
would acknowledge that what matters most is whether there is some
recognizable risk to refiling, regardless of whether that risk comes from
the expiration of the statute of limitations or the likelihood that an
appellate court will affirm a district court’s ruling on appeal.263
257

See supra notes 72–73, 185.
See Section II(B)(6)(b), supra notes 163–86 (describing cases where prevailing
parties dismissed remaining claims without prejudice to create appellate jurisdiction, and
Local Motion where the prevailing party dismissed its remaining claims with the intent of
blocking appellate jurisdiction).
259 See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984); Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d
1234 (9th Cir. 1979).
260 See Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1979).
261 See American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2003).
262 See id.
263 Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003).
258
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Although agreements dismissing claims with conditional prejudice
often times remove the statute of limitations risk traditionally applied to
dismissed claims– the removal of that risk is not the end of the analysis.
Put in another way, although parties avoid the risk that dismissed claims
will be lost due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, parties instead
run the risk that dismissed claims will be lost if the appellate court affirms
the district court’s rulings . In the event the appellate court reverses, unlike
other judgments manufactured for finality, dismissed claims are revived
and heard by the same district court where they were first dismissed. This
prevents a new district court from having to familiarize itself with the facts
of the case, saves resources avoids horizontal piecemeal litigation, and
promotes district court authority.264
Assuming that eighty percent of federal district court judgments are
affirmed on appeal, conditional finality is also efficient, because in most
cases, the remaining claims will be dismissed with prejudice. 265 As a
result, a party’s willingness to tie their ability to revive their claims to a
twenty percent chance that the appellate court will reverse the district court
is a risk of losing those claims that is likely much greater than from the
expiration of the statute of limitations. With time, parties should discover
that taking the risks associated with conditional finality is only rational if
there is a high degree of confidence that the district court made a blatant
error in its adjudication.
This type of rule is also fairer regardless of whether the appellate
courts affirms or reverses on appeal. In cases where a party is right, the
district court has made an error, and the appellate court reverses, the
parties will not have been “forced” to dismiss their remaining claims with
prejudice and lose them forever on account of an oversight. On the other
hand, in cases where the party is wrong, there is no district court error, and
the appellate court affirms, cases will end, but with the added fairness and
understanding that the decision to seek early appellate review was taken
voluntarily, and at the high risk that their remaining claims would be lost.
264 Revival of claims in the same district court prevents a new district court from having
to learn the facts and circumstances surrounding remaining claims. Also, it avoids
undermining the original district court, even if this approach requires a more expansive
view of finality than traditionally used by even Per Se and Discretionary Standard
jurisdictions. See generally supra notes. 55–79 and corresponding text.
265 THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
§ 3.01 (Fed. Jud. Center, 2nd ed. 2009) (“Pragmatically, the final-decision requirement
recognizes that most decisions appealed after final judgment – more than four out of five
– are affirmed, and presumably so would most interlocutory appeals.”); see also Chris
Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the
“Affirmance Affect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357,
358 (2005) (finding the Supreme Court reverses 64% of the time, but that appellate courts
affirm 90% of the time) cited in BAKER, supra at 8, § 1.03 n.42.
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, a discretionary standard which permits conditional
finality is designed to reward parties acting in good faith with the desire
for early appellate review. By increasing access to the appellate courts in
an incremental fashion, modernizing the final judgment rule to permit
limited forms of manufactured finality will adjust federal practice to the
new cost structures of litigation, while respecting the historic and deeply
rooted interests underlying the final judgment rule. Supreme Court action
and endorsement of discretionary criteria will help smooth the inevitable
transition to a modernized view of the final judgment rule. The resulting
increase in access to the appellate courts will save federal court resources,
provide a more level playing field for parties, and increase the quality and
fairness of settlements which define today’s high-stakes, complex, and
international litigation playing field.

